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q 201Since its emergence in the mid-1990s, unauthorized small-scale gold mining—widely known as “ninja mining”—has
grown to become a central element of Mongolia’s informal economy, engaging tens of thousands of people in seasonal,
unregulated, and occasionally dangerous labor. In this paper we set out to show that the story of ninja mining is il-
lustrative of the wider transformation of political economy that Mongolia has experienced, in which a de facto public
resource was created in the wake of the collapsed state socialist economy, only to be progressively privatized and
enclosed by increasingly powerful mining company interests. We examine the implementation of a development
project aimed at providing sustainable livelihoods for those engaged in unauthorized mining. Drawing upon anthro-
pological critiques of development, we explore the ways in which the project, while arguably succeeding in its own
terms, failed to meet the expectations of the miners involved. Committed as it was to working within the new private
property regime for land introduced by “neoliberal” reforms, the project constructed the ninja “problem” in terms of
a lack of formalization and training. It was ultimately unable to address the fundamental issues of property relations
and access to resources that lie at the heart of the ninja phenomenon.Since its emergence in the mid-1990s, the phenomenon of the
“ninja” unauthorized artisanal gold mining of Mongolia cap-
tured considerable journalistic and scholarly attention. The
spectacle of thousands of toiling people honeycombing the
landscape with hand-dug pits (see ﬁgs. S1–S7, available online)
led to a number of development initiatives designed to improve
the working conditions and security of the miners concerned.
Development assessments of ninja mining have represented it
as a response to poverty, as a livelihood “safety net,” and have
focused upon what was conceived of as a workforce within a
new, informal sector of the economy in need of formalization
and regulation.
In this paper we set out to show that the story of ninja mining
is illustrative of the wider transformation of political economy
that Mongolia has experienced, in which a de facto public re-
source was created in the wake of the collapsed state socialist
economy, only to be progressively privatized and enclosed by
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poverty, and underemployment, but a response to the ap-
pearance of a new resource, one that is now rapidly shrinking
in the face of legal and commercial appropriation. This new
resource emerged already entangled in the unique historical
and social context of the Mongolian landscape, and this is
reﬂected in the nature of the de facto commons that it created
and the resulting conﬂicts over access. Historically, the pro-
duction of new resources has led to competition and conﬂict in
Mongolia, particularly in the case of land, which has been
subject to a succession of different property regimes.1 Para-
doxically, perhaps, the reaction of development agencies to the
ninja phenomenon was generative of new resources, and new
sites for conﬂict and competition. Ultimately, however, the in-
ability to address the fundamental issues of property relations
that lay behind the ninja phenomenon made it impossible to
fully address the problems they give rise to.
Mongolia’s Scavenger Economy: Surviving the 1990s
In 1990 the Soviet-style party-state establishment that had gov-
erned Mongolia since the 1920s relinquished its monopoly of
power and introduced a multiparty parliamentary system.With1. Following Verdery (2003), we take “property regime” to indicate a
system of property relations that “organize people with respect to one
another, and to things, goods and values” (18).
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Munkherdene and Sneath Enclosing the Gold-Mining Commons of Mongolia 815the collapse of the USSR and the COMECON Soviet trading
bloc, the Mongolian state leadership rushed to make the tran-
sition from a centrally planned to a market economy. Under the
supervision of the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Devel-
opment Bank (ADB), in 1991Mongolia’s neophyte freemarket-
ers launched a “shock therapy” program to rapidly establish a
globally integrated free market economy, similar to that in-
troduced by Boris Yeltsin’s administration in Russia, and with
similarly disastrous economic results (Goldman 2003; Grifﬁn
1995; Nolan 1995).2 The strategy reﬂected neoliberal theory as
Harvey (2005:2) characterized it, in which the economy should be
emancipated from the political structure and allowed to assume
its latent “natural” form, composed of private property and the
market.3 Although in 1991 the Mongolian president Punsalma-
agiin Ochirbat (1996:235–236) predicted that the country would
rapidly develop another Asian Tiger economy, Mongolia experi-
enced something more akin to development in reverse; most
state-owned enterprises collapsed, and unemployment and un-
deremployment soared. As in Russia, incomes, public services,
and living standards plummeted (Grifﬁn 1995:viii; World Bank
1994:19). The number of people living below the poverty line
increased from almost none in 1989 to more than 33% in 1998
(United Nations Systems in Mongolia 1999:5; World Bank
1994:41). As Grifﬁn (1995:12–13) notes, the severity of the
economic collapse reﬂected both the loss of Soviet economic aid
and the way in which a new regime of private ownership was
rapidly and destructively introduced.4
The country was promoted as a resource pool for global
markets. Lhamsuren Munkh-Erdene (2011:65) describes the2. From the outset, Mongolian government policy was heavily in-
ﬂuenced by external development agencies, particularly the IMF and
ADB (Grifﬁn 1995:10; Lhamsuren Munkh-Erdene 2011:63; Rossabi 2005:
43–48).
3. Harvey (2005:2) describes neoliberalism in this sense as “a theory
of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and
skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private
property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to
create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such
practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and in-
tegrity of money. It must also set up those military, defense, police, and
legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights
and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets.
Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, ed-
ucation, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then
they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks
the state should not venture. State interventions in markets (once cre-
ated) must be kept to a bare minimum.”
4. One of the reasons for Mongolia’s economic crisis was the loss of
Soviet aid, which was reduced in 1989 and stopped altogether in 1991;
this aid was estimated to have represented as much as 30% of gross
domestic product (GDP). However, Western nations, Japan, and inter-
national ﬁnancial institutions took the place of Russia as aid donors and
economic advisers to some extent. Together these donors provided sup-
port that rose to represent 25% of GDP by 1996 (Bruun and Odgaard
1996:26).
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the market in which the Soviet-style regime was reincarnated as
a neoliberal “night watchman” state, and parts of the Com-
munist nomenklatura successfully reinvented themselves as
an oligarchic plutocracy by acquiring ownership of the few re-
maining sources of large-scale wealth. Mongolia’s socialist-era
industrial sector was largely abandoned alongside Mongolia’s
socialist welfare system, which was starved of resources.
The effect was tomake a large part of the national population
dependent upon a kind of “scavenger economy” in which the
key to realizing value was the location, appropriation, and sale of
resources left over from the collapse of the state-planned econ-
omy. Scrap metal, for example, extracted from closed-down
factories, railway lines, and Sovietmilitary bases became amajor
sector of the economy (Byambabaatar 2016). In the capital city
of Ulaanbaatar, begging street children and dusty ﬁgures col-
lecting discarded plastic bottles became common sights. In the
peri-urban districts of Ulaanbaatar and across the country it be-
came common to see piles of scavenged materials in the house-
holdenclosures(hashaas)of theyurt (ger)orcabindwellings that
most households lived in. Even the bricks and concrete slab
sections of blocks of ﬂats made derelict by the collapse of infra-
structure and services were extracted and could be seen piled up,
ready for sale or reuse (ﬁg. 1).
The Rise of the Ninja
One of the most dramatic developments of the 1990s was the
appearance of “ninja”miners. Thesewere generally small groups
of people who went to areas with gold deposits and began to
mine and extract gold without any ofﬁcial authorization. The
origin of the term “ninja” is not entirely clear. The most com-
mon explanation is that when wearing the large plastic bowls
used for gold panning on their backs, they resembled the TV
Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles. The association of the ninja
with stealth, however, resonates with another aspect of this
practice—its unauthorized or illegal nature. The term has a
faintly derogatory tone, however, andmost of those involved do
not much like being called ninja. The development literature
generally uses the term “artisanal and small-scale gold mining”
(ASGM) and bichil uurhai (micro mining) in Mongolian. The
practice mushroomed, and by the late 1990s, many tens of
thousands of people were engaged in ninja mining.
As Humphrey (2010) noted, this “gold rush” was one of the
most signiﬁcant developments in the rural economy since the
collapse of state socialism. In many regions, there were few pas-
toralist and unemployed families without at least one member
working in the goldﬁelds (High 2008; Humphrey 2010:5). The
work itself is grueling and frequently dangerous; inmost cases, it
involves hand-digging holes several meters deep to ﬁnd alluvial
earth with a gold content and then laboriously hauling this to
the surface where gold can be separated by panning or the use
of a vibrating table (ﬁg. 2). The holes dug in this way can be 10m
or more in depth; many are unsupported and liable to collapse,
causing numerous fatalities (Munkherdene 2011:42–44). In1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
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816 Current Anthropology Volume 59, Number 6, December 2018hard-rock areas, explosives and chiseling are used to extract
rock that is broken down by hammering and then milled to
sand-sized particles by machine. The gold is then extracted by
the use ofmercury or cyanide, with all the attendant health risks
(Murray and Grayson 2003:45–46).
At ﬁrst glance, then, ninja mining is a classic symptom of
Mongolia’s “neoliberal” era and another example of globally
expanding conditions of precarity. Economically disenfran-
chised by mass unemployment, large parts of the Mongolian
public were driven literally underground to seek out precarious
livelihoods in a harsh new sector of the informal economy. The
inversion of the relative structural positions of the formal and
informal sectors gave rise to what Davis (2004) has described as
“informal survivalism” (26).5
The phenomenon attracted foreign media attention, and in-
ternational development agencies quickly identiﬁed “ninja min-
ing” as one of the most signiﬁcant social problems in Mongolia
(Grayson 2007:1; Murray and Grayson 2003:7; Navch et al.
2006:17; World Bank 2006:1).6 One strand in development lit-
erature emphasized the desperately harsh working conditions
of unauthorized miners and the social and environmental dam-5. As Millar (2014:49) remarks in the case of Brazil, “The ﬁgure of the
unemployed worker sifting through refuse on a city dump certainly
evokes what Mike Davis (2004:26) has termed ‘informal survivalism.’ ”
6. An International Labour Organization report, for example, notes,
“In recent years, an increasing number of Mongolians has turned to
informal gold mining for their livelihood. This is because a number of
environmental and economic factors have reduced rural income op-
portunities, decimated livestock herds and led to rising unemployment in
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because the metal is widely used to extract the gold (see, e.g.,
Munkherdene 2011:39; UNEP 2012:4–5). Large numbers of
children were involvedwith the work, and there was widespread
concern as to the negative impact on their health and education
(Navch et al. 2006). Another more inﬂuential strand empha-
sized the income-generating potential of the new activities.
Given the need for a subsistence safety net in the face of un-
employment, underemployment, and poverty, “artisanal and
small-scale mining” offered a trickle of hard-earned wealth to
those most in need, and it did so within a free market and at
almost no cost to the state (Grayson et al. 2003:19; World Bank
2006:8). Another idea was that the practice retained “rural
people” in the countryside and reduced the ﬂow of people into
the peri-urban periphery of the capital city Ulaanbaatar. A
World Bank consultant, for example, noted that there were
“signiﬁcant advantages with a well-developed small-scale min-
ing [sector]. It supports a large group of people and it signiﬁ-
cantly reduces the migration from rural areas to cities” (Appel
2005:10). A 2012 United Nations Environment Program report
notes, for example, “ASGMha a huge development potential in
rural economies . . . revenue is injected directly into local
economies with local citizens directly beneﬁting from otherwise
non-economic deposits (by LSM standards). This can only be
realized whenASGM is formalized and given chance to show its
socio-economic beneﬁts” (UNEP 2012:7).Figure 1. Salvaged building materials from derelict buildings in background. Shiveegov’ Gov’sümber Province, July 2004. Photo by
D. Sneath. A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.both rural and urban areas. These people see few alternatives to gold
mining” (Thomas and Ganbaatar 2006:3).
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8. This logic led to proposals for partnership schemes in which ex-
ternal agencies would operate with the government to create a legitimate
small-scale mining artisanal sector and develop the local economy in
rural areas. Following these recommendations, the SDC strongly advo-
cated for legislation to allow the formalization of the sector through the
Munkherdene and Sneath Enclosing the Gold-Mining Commons of Mongolia 817Mongolia’s “gold rush” attracted enormous numbers of peo-
ple, but estimates as to just how many remained vague. The
World Bank (2006:1) estimated the number of ninja miners in
the country in the early twenty-ﬁrst century at between 30,000
and 100,000. Other development agencies, such as the Swiss
Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), tend to use
the higher end of this range, claiming that over 100,000 people
worked in the sector in 2005 (SDC 2015:1; see Grayson et al.
2003; Murray and Grayson 2003).7 These agencies and popular
press articles tend to cite the large, round number estimate of
100,000 found in other development reports (see, e.g., Knight
2007; Navch et al. 2006:17), although higher estimates also
circulated; the Asia Foundation (2006), for example, reported
approximately 250,000 ninja miners.
However, when the ﬁrst systematic ofﬁcial count was
carried out in 2012, the Mongolian Statistical Ofﬁce (2012:15)
recorded just 13,400 people working in the small-scale min-
ing sector, little more than a tenth of the earlier estimates.
How can this huge discrepancy be explained? First, the lower
ofﬁcial ﬁgures reﬂect the ephemeral, ﬂuid nature of the ninja
phenomenon, which for most of those involved is a practice
rather than an occupation. Many people worked in the gold-
ﬁelds for a fewweeks ormonths, often in the summer, and then
returned to other jobs and pursuits in rural districts and the7. See the SDC Sustainable Artisanal Mining project website: http://
sam.mn.
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a proportion of those involved. Second, the gap reﬂects the
fact that the numbers of people engaging in the practice has
dropped markedly since the boom in the early to mid-2000s.
The SDC, for example, has revised its estimate of the numbers
of artisanal miners in 2015 down to 60,000. It is interesting to
note, however, that the older estimate of 100,000 ninja miners
continues to circulate in press reports (e.g., Brook 2015; Laiz
and Rengel 2014).
The Sustainable Artisanal Mining Project
and the Unsustainable Ninja
The tenor of development agency treatments was that the
Mongolian government should view artisanal mining as a
form of poverty alleviation, comparable to similar self-help
strategies found in Africa and elsewhere in the developing
world.8 In 2005 the SDC launched the Sustainable ArtisanalFigure 2. Sifting alluvial soil using gravitation and compressor. Zaamar, June 2013. Photo by G. Munkherdene. A color version of this
ﬁgure is available online.establishment of ofﬁcially recognized mining organizations. This posi-
tion reﬂects international policy debates surrounding small-scale infor-
mal mining elsewhere. Siegel and Veiga (2010), for example, identify two
broad policy positions on artisanal mining in general, throughout the
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nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
818 Current Anthropology Volume 59, Number 6, December 2018Mining Project (SAM project). The SDC characterized artisanal
and small-scale mining as a poverty-driven subsistence activity
that engaged over 100,000 people, primarily former herders and
laid-off factory workers who extract tiny gold nuggets and, to a
lesser extent, coal and ﬂuorspar from unsafe, illegal castings and
waste heaps. In the SDC narrative, informal artisanal mining
was at risk of becoming a vast, uncontrollable process, resulting
in serious social and environmental impacts. If the sector was
properly formalized through laws and regulations, the argument
went, it represented an enormous potential for local develop-
ment and rural income enhancement (SDC 2012b:1). The main
goals of the project, therefore, were to gain recognition for ar-
tisanal mining as a formal subsector contributing to Mongolia’s
economic development and to provide the training and “ca-
pacity building” to develop an “economically sustainable, en-
vironmentally responsible and human rights based ASM sector
in Mongolia beneﬁting from, and contributing to, global best
practice regarding artisanal and small-scale mining” (SDC
2015:1).9 The main vehicle for formalization was to be the
nongovernmental organization (NGO; töriin büs baiguullaga)
made up of one or more mining teams termed “partnerships”
(nökhörlöl). AnNGO could then be legally registered, pay taxes,
and enter into a three-way agreementwith local government and
a mining company to be granted rights to work a plot of land.
Judging by its publicity material, the SAM project appears
highly successful (SDC 2015, 2016). By the start of 2013, more
than 550 partnerships had been established across the country,
with a totalmembership of about 5,000 artisanalminers. Around
50 plots of mining land had been granted to partnership NGOs,
totaling some 740 hectares.10 The project also organized training,
meetings, forums, and conferences engaging international andna-
tional research agencies, government ofﬁcials, and ninja miners.
ASM miners who were members of the project visited Latin
American countries such as Bolivia and Peru along with project
staff and government ofﬁcials to learn about partnership for-
malization and the legal position of artisanal mining there.
Of the 200 or more ninja mining sites that sprung up across
Mongolia, the largest was in the district (sum) of Zaamar, lo-
cated some 190 km northwest from Ulaanbaatar. Zaamar was
one of the principal sites for the SAM project. From 2010 to
2013 it claimed to have established 28 partnerships with a9. The main objectives of the project are the promotion of “profes-
sionalism and accountability to facilitate the shift from poverty to pros-
perity through responsible artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) and a
transparent formal supply chain” (SDC 2016:1).
10. SDC SAM project website: http://sam.mn/mn/sam-project-news
/250-2012-08-14-01-36-42.html.
developing world. The ﬁrst attempts to form the practice into a sus-
tainable livelihood for local miners, and the second tries to introduce
alternative livelihoods so as to displace mining altogether. They argued
that since it is frequently unrealistic to try to introduce alternative
livelihoods, the ﬁrst approach is often most sensible.
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called Enkhmönkh.11
One of the authors of this paper, G.Munkherdene, worked as
a seasonal ninja miner in Bayankhongor Province (aimag) from
2002 to 2007 and carried out ﬁeld research among artisanal
miners in a number of provinces and districts, concentrating on
Zaamar in 2013 and 2014. He got to know one of the seven
founding members of Enkhmönkh well, a highly active woman
in her midforties that we shall call Bolormaa, who hadmoved to
Zaamar from a neighboring province in 2006 to establish a
mining partnership under the auspices of the SAM project.
Bolormaa was a veteran development project worker, having
engaged with several other rural livelihood projects since 1992
and earning the nickname Tösöl Bolormaa (“Project Bolor-
maa”) in her native district before moving to Zaamar. Since
arriving, she had become well known for participating in every
local event and initiative.
On paper Enkhmönkh included 23 partnerships with
128members supported by the project. TheNGOwas presented
as a model for artisanal mining nationally and attracted some
media attention. Nevertheless, the NGO collapsed in early 2013
for a number of reasons. Bolormaa explained the failure as a
result of incomprehensible and ultimately useless “support”
from the SAMproject: “The project spent most of themoney on
the trainers, translators, foreign experts and administrative
expenses, not on us. . . . The project did not solve our problems
when it came to using land. They bought no equipment for us. I
don’t understand what the project aims and obligations were”
(interview, Zaamar Sum [district], June 2013).
The miners hoped to acquire equipment, funding, and
support in negotiating contracts with the local mining com-
panies to allow them to reexcavate some areas that had al-
ready been mined for gold using old and inefﬁcient methods.
But the local mining companies have simply not granted
enough viable mining sites to the partnerships, and the SAM
project seemed unable to persuade them to. The head of an-
other of the partnerships, the woman we shall call Gereltuya,
explained:
The project . . . write on their website that 20 partnerships are
successfully functioning and each member of the partnership
earns 700,000 MNT [Mongolian tugrik; around US$388] per
month; but this is not true. To my knowledge, only two part-
nerships are working, and they work part time . . . we only
work 2 to 4 times a month. Each time we work for only 2 to
4 hours. Each of us only gets 100,000–150,000 MNT [US$55–
83] permonth becausewe do not have enough land to use. . . .
For this reason, the project is useless for us. Gold digging is just11. The NGO’s full name was Enkh Mönkh Ergekh Kholboo but was
generally known as Enkhmönkh. See National Network for Information
of Small-Scale Miners website: https://bichiluurhai.mn/project-details/%D1
%8D%D0%BD%D1%85-%D0%BC%D3%A9%D0%BD%D1%85-%D1%8D
%D1%80%D0%B3%D1%8D%D1%85-%D1%85%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B1
%D0%BE%D0%BE-%D1%82%D0%B1%D0%B1/.
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13. In the case of Zaamar, joint Russian-Mongolian geological expedi-
Munkherdene and Sneath Enclosing the Gold-Mining Commons of Mongolia 819a secondary source of income [for us]. (Interview, Zaamar
Sum [district], June 2013)
Project staff, however, described the situation in terms of
success and achievement (see, e.g., SDC 2015:18–20; Singo,
n.d.). Indeed, at an international forum in Ulaanbaatar in 2015,
project staff described Enkhmönkh as symbolic of the project’s
achievements and failed tomention that the NGOhad dissolved
2 years earlier amid bitter disputes over ﬁnances that led to legal
proceedings.
In many ways this picture is familiar to students of the an-
thropology of development. It could be seen as another instance
of development as a discursive formation that, following Fer-
guson (1994) and Escobar (1994), consistently fails to help poor
people. The mismatch between the goals of the project staff and
those of the recipients, for example, seems to answer well to
Mosse’s (2005) characterization of development policy. He
notes that whatever its ofﬁcial claims, a policy primarily func-
tions tomobilize andmaintain institutional political support; its
primary purpose is generally to legitimize itself rather than to
orient practice. Furthermore, policy models that work well to
legitimize and mobilize political support frequently provide a
poor guide to action.12
What, then, was the substance of the differences between the
development project representation of ninja mining and the
understandings of those actually engaged in the practice? One
central difference was that while the project was concerned with
the formalization of mining as an occupation, those doing min-
ing work were concerned with access to resources—primarily
the gold-bearing land needed for excavation and, to a lesser
extent, the equipment required to make the work practicable.
The primary aim of the project was occupational—to insert
“micro miners” into the formal economy to permit professional-
ization and regulation. This was an appealing goal, well able to
mobilize the necessary political support. A quarter of a century
after the collapse of state socialism, the idea of secure salaried
employment within a recognized profession remains an over-
whelmingly popular aspiration throughout the country. The
prospect of transforming precarious self-help gold scavenging
into“proper” jobswashighlyappealing tomanyof those involved,
as well as policy makers. The environmental and social costs of
unrestricted ninja mine workings were causes of public concern
throughout the country, fueling calls for regulation. Seen in terms
of artisanal mining as an occupation notionally found through-
out the world, the project goals seem perfectly well judged.
But if one locates the gold rush in the wider picture of Mon-
golia’s political economy, a different understanding emerges.
Throughout the 1990s the bulk of the population had been
concerned with the hunt for sources of wealth. Like the derelict12. Mosse (2005) makes three further points: that development proj-
ects work to maintain themselves as coherent policy ideas (as systems of
representations) as well as operational systems; that in these systems,
projects do not themselves fail—they are failed by wider networks of
support and validation; and that success and failure are policy-oriented
judgments that tend to obscure project effects.
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transformation of the resources generated by the old Soviet-style
economy. In this case, however, it was rooted in a knowledge
product.
Production of a De Facto Public Resource
Extensive Soviet-Mongolian geological survey work carried out
in the 1970s and 1980s had discovered vast amounts of mineral
resources, including large amounts of ready-to-mine alluvial
gold deposits.13 In the 1990s, in an attempt to create business
opportunities, the Mongolian state made public the previously
secret mineral survey materials of the State Geofund. This
formed part of the government’s Gold Program that granted
exploitation licenses and loans to mining businesses and trig-
gered a company-driven gold rush in 1994 (Grayson 2007:3).
Many geologists, mining engineers, and mine workers had
beenmade unemployed by the collapse of state companies. They
lacked the wealth needed to buy mining licenses, but they had
the skills and simple tools needed to exploit the new public
resource that had been inadvertently created—the knowledge of
where to ﬁnd accessible gold deposits. A lack of authorization
was not a powerful disincentive. The collapse of state socialism
had undermined both the state’s moral authority and its ability
to enforce laws, and all sorts of illegal activity mushroomed in
the 1990s. Mongolians had learned that if something of value
was there for the taking, then someone generally took it.
The ﬁrst wave of unauthorized gold digging emerged in
1995–1996 and was highly skilled, involving relatively small
numbers of former miners and their families, probably a few
thousand people at most. Zaamar was one of the ﬁrst sites for
this activity. Large numbers of locals joined the backbreaking
but proﬁtable early wave of “ninja” mining. The expansion of
mining by private companies in 1997–1998 drew many of the
skilled miners back into regular employment, but in 1999 eco-
nomic conditions worsened in Mongolia as a whole, and illicit
mining began to attract tens of thousands of people in what
Grayson (2007) called “the people’s gold-rush” (4).
Far from retaining “rural people” in the countryside, the gold
rush produced waves of seasonal movement from all over the
country, including large ﬂows from the city ofUlaanbaatar itself.
Ger (yurt) settlements of thousands of people, with temporary
shops, bars, and service traders, appeared for the thronging
summer season and shrank back to a small core over the winter
months. The most famous of these sites appeared in 1998 in
Zaamar on the banks of the Tuul River, known as Persiin Bulan
(Persian Gulf ) because the proliferation of mining teams theretions began searching formineral resources in the late 1970s. From 1979 on-
ward, a number of survey expeditions were carried out in this area, including
the Darkhan Geological Search Expedition and a survey by the Janchivlan
Geological Company. In 1984, Russian geologist A. I. Kirsanov estimated the
overall size of the alluvial gold deposit of the Tuul River at 74.9 tonnes. From
1984 to 1987, the Darkhan Geological Search Expedition extensively drilled
the Tuul Valley (Karpoff and Roscoe 2005:23–24).
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the Gulf War of 1990–1991.
But the bulk of those engaged in such mining were not there
to enter a new occupation or to become full-time miners. They
were there to access a relatively new form of de facto public
resource, the gold that lay in the ground and that at present was
relatively free for the taking—albeit at the price of grueling hard
labor. Many of those working the goldﬁelds over the summer
months were from herding families, many were students, others
unemployed workers. They worked for money to realize some
other goals theymight have, and they would stopwhen they had
earned enough, had to return to their other activities, or could
simply bear no more of the grueling work.
Enclosing the Gold-Mining Commons
The gold rush peaked around 2006–2007, and since about 2009
the numbers of those involved have declined by all accounts.
This was not because of an expansion of alternative sources of
livelihood or because the demand for additional income has
declined. The principal cause is that the mining companies have
been increasingly successful at enforcing their legal rights of
exclusion. As mining companies have expanded the scope of
their operations, the areas left for illicit exploitation have shrunk.
Companies have also beenmore successful at enlisting the state
in the defense of their interests. The rule of law has increased
since the 1990s, and the police have become more active in
preventing and punishing “ninja” activity. Despite SDC lob-
bying, the Mongolian state has made only the most minor
modiﬁcation to the relevant laws.14 Mining companies have
made increasing use of private security guards to patrol and
enforce exclusion zones. The de facto gold-mining commons
have now been largely enclosed by private company owners.15
This process is illustrated by the stories of three Zaamar
residents, whom we shall call Boldbaatar, Batbayar, and Tuya.
Aged 27 at time of writing, Boldbaatar’s family had lost all but
150 of their livestock in the harsh winter (zud) of 2002 and
moved toZaamar fromanother province.His father foundwork
in a local Mongolian-Russian joint mining company, and the14. A 2010 amendment to the Law on Minerals (4.1.23) allows local
government to grant access to certain categories of land to micro-mining
groups made up of district residents within registered partnerships
(nökhörlöl ) or cooperatives (khorshoo; State Great Khural, Mongolian
Law on Minerals, Ulaanbaatar: House of State, 2006:2). In practice, how-
ever, access to gold-bearing land must generally be agreed by the relevant
mining company as well as local government.
15. It should be noted that although the expansion of company
mining has drastically reduced ninja opportunities, it has also entailed
some increase in the number of people in formal employment in the
sector, an arguable improvement in the prospects of effectively moni-
toring environmental damage, some increase in tax revenue, and other
effects widely seen as positive. A full evaluation of the social, economic,
and environmental effects of these changes lies beyond the scope of this
paper, however, which is primarily concerned with describing the nature
of the historical processes under way.
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allowed them to expand their holding to 800 head. Until 2004,
when he ﬁnished high school, Boldbaatar and his friends would
go ninjamining in the long summer holidays. Boldbaatar’s sister
went to university while he stayed to workwith the livestock and
do informal seasonal mining, a common pattern among Mon-
golian rural families, many of whom keep at least one son at
home to herd livestock but are keen to invest in the education of
other children, frequently daughters.
After around 2006 it became increasingly difﬁcult for
Boldbaatar and his old school friends to get access to the gold
sites in the face of expanding company security. Their main
tactic became one of effectively stealing soil from sites and
bringing it off company land to process it for gold. But theywere
caught by guards more and more frequently. At ﬁrst punish-
ment tended to be conﬁscation of any gold and being forced to
do chores for the company such as cutting wood, cleaning
buildings and gers, fetchingwater, and so on. Later, however, the
guards would punish them with beatings, secure in the knowl-
edge that the “thieves”would not report them to the local police.
In 2009–2010 another harsh winter (zud) killed all but 100 of the
family’s livestock, and Boldbaatar and his father joined one of
the SAMproject-sponsored partnerships in the hope of gaining
legal rights for small-scale mining (ﬁg. 3). However, although
the partnership managed to establish the recommended agree-
ments with local government and a large mining company, the
actual allocations of land made by the company to the part-
nership were very few and far between—too small to allow
partnership members to make more than a pittance. As a result,
Boldbaatar would work “legally” when the partnership was al-
located some land to work, and when this was exhausted, he
resorted to the tactic of stealing soil. However, the increasing
difﬁculty of both methods meant diminishing returns from
mining, and by 2013 Boldbaatar was looking to pastoralism for
his future livelihood. Provided he could expand his herds, he
was ready to drop out of mining entirely.
The situation of the couple we shall call Batbayar and Tuya
was rather different. In their midforties and both born in
Zaamar, Batbayar and Tuya are shop owners and local gold
traders who spend the summer months selling goods to
ninjas and locals in Zaamar and the winter in the three-room
ﬂat they own in the capital city of Ulaanbaatar. Batbayar
completed professional training as a tractor driver, but after
the collapse of the old system, he, like so many others, lost his
job and made a living by herding livestock. When the ﬁrst
private mining companies began to operate in the district
around 1993, Batbayar got a job as a driver. Tuya had been
training to be teacher in the district school, but job prospects
collapsed in the 1990s. They married in 1995 and their
daughter was born the following year. The couple planned to
go to South Korea as migrant laborers, but only Tuya re-
ceived the necessary visa, and Batbayar lost his job in the
confusion. Batbayar started ninja mining in 1999 to support
his mother and daughter. Tuya sent money, and with it the
family opened a kiosk shop (tüts) in the subdistrict (bag)1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
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16. “Joan Martinez Alier (2002) deﬁnes political ecology as the study of
ecological distribution conﬂicts. By this he means conﬂicts over access to,
and control over, natural resources, particularly as a source of livelihoods,
including the costs of environmental destruction. ‘Ecological distribution
conﬂicts,’ however, exist in the context of economies, cultures, and forms of
knowledge.”
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kiosk and took up mining opportunities whenever they ap-
peared. In 2008, after 6 years in South Korea and 3 years in
the United States, Tuya returned. The family now has a large
shop, a gold trading business, and three children, the eldest of
which they hope to send to the United States to study English
at school and business or economics at university.
Batbayar is a member of another of the SAM project-
sponsored partnerships, which he joined in 2011. Relatively
wealthy and with a successful local business, Batbayar hardly
matched the image of a desperate member of the precariat.
He explained his reasons for joining in the following way:
There’s no one who doesn’t like money. [Micro mining] is not
my full-time job. . . . My ﬁrst profession is that of driver.
Maybe [you could say] my second is as a ninja. Indeed, I
thought that the partnershipwould give us a new chance to dig
for gold and make money. But it hasn’t. The project people
told us so many good things. But those words were false. My
partnership is not permitted any land now. It has not worked
successfully since it was established. We are just waiting for
news from the boss of the partnership. This year we’ve been
able to go gold mining just six times. It is not a proﬁtable
job. . . . Everybody has their own job or something else to do.
Some of them are herders, some of them are workers in
companies in Zaamar, and some of them are businesspeople
like me. If the company gives us land, then we work on this
land. If not, we can only steal soil from company land. But we
need to live. Life is tough. (Batbayar, interview, June 2014)
This is a matter of political ecology, as Escobar (2006) applies
the term, followingMartinez Alier, that is, “conﬂicts over accessThis content downloaded from 131.11
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms ato, and control over, natural resources, particularly as a source of
livelihoods” (8).16 But for anthropologists, “the natural” is a
social construct, and conceptualizations of the environment are
produced by “ever-changing historical contexts and cultural
speciﬁcities” (Descola and Pálsson 1996:15). The gold-mining
commons existed within the distinctive and intensely historical
environment of the Mongolian landscape. To understand it,
then, we need to examine its particularities.
Historically, rights to land on the Mongolian steppe have
been rather different from those of individual private owner-
ship. Mobile pastoralism, which dominated the economy until
the 1960s, and which remains central to most rural livelihoods,
involves the combination of exclusive rights to the use of some
areas of land withmore public access to other seasonal pastures,
regulated by local political authorities. This was true of both
prerevolutionary and collectivized pastoralism. Although the
introduction of the Soviet-inspired negdel collective farms, with
their bureaucratic structures and mechanized support facilities,
represented a radical break with the past in many ways, in some
respects the new institutions resembled the older monastic and
aristocratic estates that they had replaced. Individual private
ownership of land in the current commercial sense was not a
possibility in either of these political economies. In the prerev-
olutionary era, land “belonged” to the emperor, to the prince ofFigure 3. Boldbaatar’s father and younger sister sifting alluvial soil using gravitation. Zaamar, June 2013. Photo by G. Munkherdene.
A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
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ezed, sabdug, and lus) of Buddhist cosmology (Sneath 2014:461).
In the state socialist period, land ownership was assigned to the
sacralized nation-state and its people, with access to pasture
administered by the ofﬁcials of the collective and state farms. In
neither period was access to grazing land a free-for-all; local
authorities always regulated land use among those entitled to
use it, and excluded others. But the landscape remained, in some
senses, public; it could not be held by individuals in the same
way as mundane possessions could.
Much of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century history
of the region can be seen in terms of competing property re-
gimes for land; the confrontation between “custodial” mobile
pastoral Mongolian rights to territory on the one hand, and the
more individual and commercial ownership forms of Chinese
agriculture on the other (Sneath 2004:166–170). The advance of
Chinese settlement in Inner Mongolia created widespread un-
rest and helped fuel the independence movement that led to the
establishment of an autonomous Mongolian state in 1911
(Lattimore 1934:114). By the end of the twentieth century, land
ownership had become the subject of dispute once more. In the
1990s the ADB and other international development agencies
strongly recommended the introduction of legislation allowing
the private ownership of land. But the Mongolian parliament
consistently refused to allow pastureland—the vast majority of
the Mongolian landscape—to be privatized, although it did
introduce a private property regime for urban land and a system
of certiﬁcation that gave rights of “possession” (ezemshikh) for
certain pastoral sites. This reﬂected a widespread public feeling
that land should remain, in some senses, public. This is not just a
pastoral sensibility; throughout the state socialist period, and
still to some extent today, families would leave the urban centers
and spend the summer months with relatives and friends in the
zuslan—summer pastures and camps. Those with motor ve-
hicles expect to be able to drive them pretty much anywhere
they can physically go. Mongolians feel entitled to their national
landscape.
It was in this historical and sociocultural context, then, that
unauthorized micro mining boomed. Most of the companies
that had hastily bought mining licenses in the 1990s could not
enforce their exclusive rights to the land concerned. Neither
could the tiny underresourced police forces in the localities
concerned, particularly because at ﬁrst the activity seemed to
occupy a moral and perhaps legal gray area.
The extension of de jure and later de facto corporate own-
ership to the mineral resources of Mongolia resembles Marxist
concepts of primitive accumulation or what Harvey (2005)
describes as neoliberal “accumulation by dispossession”—the
“corporatization, commodiﬁcation, and privatization of hith-
erto public assets” (160).17 However, in the longer term we ob-17. Similarly, the historical process wouldmatchTsing’s (2015) notion of
“salvage accumulation”—the amassment of capitalist wealth through the
conversion of material with other histories of social relations.
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resourciﬁcation: the introduction of discursive formations in
which items appear as resources—that is, sources of potential
wealth. The practices and discourses of state socialist geology
transformed the mineral content of land into a potential re-
source. These originally state resources were transformed again
into commercial and, inadvertently, into de facto public re-
sources by the state’s release of Geofund materials. The new
discursive regime was not undisputed, however. Some narra-
tives within public culture rejected, or at least qualiﬁed, the
notion of land as a resource formineral extraction. Buddhist and
shamanic narratives commonly stressed the dangers of ignoring
the spiritual owners or masters of the land used for mining
(High 2017; Sneath 2014:467), and some lamas are now regu-
larly engaged by companies to perform appeasement ceremo-
nies for local spirit masters before starting new mines (High
2013:761, 2016:80). The diverse discourses surrounding land,
landscape, and property often include cosmological references,
and links are often made among environmentalist, Buddhist,
shamanist, and nationalist positions in protests and political
movements.18 But such narratives feature relatively rarely in the
everyday discourses of unauthorizedminers, many of whom are
privately agnostic as to the existence of local spirits. Almost as
soon as it became a recognized source of wealth, gold-bearing
land became subject to the discourse of resources (nööts).
Rights of Access and the Notion
of the Nutag (Homeland)
The concept of nutag, meaning homeland or territory, has be-
come a central value in private and public discourse. Used to
evoke emotive attachment to the “home,” it can operate at
different scales so as to apply to a locality, district, province, or
the entire nation (Mongol nutag). It has become a central term
in all sorts of political and cultural projects (Sneath 2010:258).
The 1990s saw a proliferation of organizations called “homeland
councils” (nutgiin zövlöl), for example. These recruited mem-
bers of the business, political, and cultural elites to represent the
interests of localities and provinces through fund-raising, lob-
bying, and preferential treatment (Sneath 2010). This reﬂects a
powerful sense of localism that we term “nutagism”: a trans-
posable nationalist-style logic of attachment that can be used
discursively to root persons in places and to make claims as to
who is entitled to what.
Entitlement to resources has become a central value in per-
sonal and political sensibilities. This concern with rights of ac-
cess surfaces continually in people’s narratives and descriptions
of the situation. Zaamar residents, almost all of whomhave been
involved in unauthorized mining networks, generally resent the
“outsider” (gadny) ninjas who ﬂooded in and out of the district.
A popular view among district (sum) residents is that only locals18. For shamanic narratives on mining, environmentalism, and re-
source nationalism, see Shimamura (2014:404–406).
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are in their “homeland” (nutag). Residents of the subdistrict
(bag) tend to the view that only subdistrict residents should have
such rights, for the same reason, because the gold is in their
nutag.Miners fromoutside the district point toArticle 6.1 of the
Constitution, which states that the land and natural resources of
Mongolia shall be subject to the “people’s power” (ard tümnii
medeld) under “state protection” (töriin khamgaalaltad).19 The
land belongs to all citizens of the Mongolian homeland, they
argue, and they have a moral right to use it. Wherever they were
from,members of amicro-mining team frequently resent others
who might compete with them.
In the goldﬁelds themselves, miners tried to continually mon-
itor the productivity of the other plots, watching how much
gold the team seemed to be ﬁnding and occasionally inspecting
theworkingsby stealth if opportunityarose.Areas thought tobe
markedly richer than the others were liable to have soil “stolen”
from them if unattended or to be taken over entirely by one of
the larger and more intimidating teams. News of people being
pushed off their plots circulated continuously, and the usual
reactionwas to assume the soil theremust beparticularly rich in
gold. In some cases, one team would mobilize several others to
mount a joint “attack” (dairakh) or “robbery” (bulaakh) on a
working thought to be particularly valuable. In these disputes
the larger teams with better local networks generally had the
advantage because they could mobilize larger numbers and the
only real arbiterof competingclaimswasphysical force.20 Fights
were common, particularly in the evenings when many people
drank vodka, and one of the most important root causes was
competition between teams. As a result, team members were
cagey about howmuch gold theywere ﬁnding.Much effort went
into maintaining de facto rights over good plots, and this could
only really be achieved by the threat of physical force. Teams
frequently posted members at their workings overnight in the
summer months to try to prevent other teams occupying or
stealing soil from them.21
This need to defend access to resources mirrors rural expe-
riences of disputes over grazing land. The economic collapse of19. The next article of the constitution, Article 6.2, however, states: “The
land, except that given to the citizens of Mongolia for private ownership, as
well as the subsoil with its mineral resources, forests, water resources, and
wildfowl, shall be the property of the State.” This article is hardly ever
mentioned in this context.
20. One such takeover, witnessed by one of the authors in April 2010,
took place in a goldﬁeld called “Altan-Uul” in Biger Sum, Gobi-Altai
Province. Most of the teams were facing disappointing yields at the time,
and a rumor circulated that the plot of a team from a more distant sum
(district) contained rich deposits. After some mutual encouragement,
several other teams mounted a joint invasion of the site. Outnumbered
by locals, the original plot occupants could only watch as “their” site was
taken over and mined by others.
21. Some teams monitored prime gold-digging plots in the winter and
early spring to try to keep others off “their” spots until the team could
start work again when the weather improved.
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the ﬁrst time. As they lost their jobs, large numbers of Mon-
golians tried to make a living raising livestock. This trebled the
number of workers directly reliant on pastoralism for their
livelihood from less than 18% of the national workforce in 1989
to 50% of the working population in 1998 (National Statistical
Ofﬁce of Mongolia 1999:45, 95; Statistical Ofﬁce of Mongolia
1993:6). These “new herders” (shine malchid) attracted much
criticism, not only for their poor pastoral judgment and lack of
skill but for their tendency to move with their livestock onto the
seasonal pastures of other districts and households and graze off
the vegetation used by locals. In this case, however, local district
authorities could be invoked to settle disputes and exclude those
without rights to land, and they became increasingly effective at
doing so. But the anxieties and conﬂicts surrounding access to
pastureland helped fuel defensive nutagism, and a powerful
response to the hardship of the 1990s was the impulse to protect
access to local resources, be they pastoral, political, or mineral.
Conclusion
In retrospect, the story of ninjamining reﬂects three intertwined
processes that have shaped contemporary Mongolia. Over the
long term we see processes of resourciﬁcation whereby the
different regimes of value for land in prerevolutionary, state
socialist, and neoliberal Mongolia created new resources and
attendant property regimes. The latest of these regimes was, at
ﬁrst, simply unenforceable in the face of the popular reaction to
the appearance of accessible gold as a resource. Interestingly,
given the history ofMongolian attitudes toward land, the default
property regime for the gold-bearing areas was a de facto
commons, whatever its legal status. Far from being rapidly
naturalized under market conditions, the new private property
regime had to be imposed and maintained by force, using
company guards and police. Placed as it was outside political
authority, however, the new commons was far from harmoni-
ous. Contra Lockean notions of property, in which the appli-
cation of labor tomatter creates natural rights of ownership over
it (Locke 2007 [1689]:42), working on a speciﬁc plot gave no
recognized rights, and powerful mining teams evicted weaker
groups if they felt like it. Partly, of course, this reﬂected the illegal
status of the activity. But it also reﬂected the method by which
land could be made to realize value. The goal was to extract the
gold and move on, and ninjas have no interest in retaining
property relations to land after working it out. Unsurprisingly,
then, the disputes over land for mining did not display the sort
of agricultural logics of the Paraguayan peasants studied by
Hetherington (2009) for whom long-term cultivation of land
gave moral rights of ownership over it. The critical factor for
ninja miners was the ability to gain access to land and use it, not
to own it; and in this respect, it resembledmobile pastoralism, in
which the land ultimately belonged to higher authorities and
rights to use it were amatter of political entitlement. Conﬂicting
notions as to who should have access to gold-bearing land
followed a similar logic, reﬂecting the central importance of the1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
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from attachment to the homeland.
In addition, we see that the reaction of the development
sector to the people’s gold rush was to approachmicrominers in
occupational terms, as a workforce lacking certain forms of
knowledge and organization, and therefore in need of expert
advice and training. Instead of the cash and equipment they
hoped for, the miners were given “knowledge exports” from the
developed world: lectures, workshops, and seminars.22 These
were results that the project could deliver, whereas the funda-
mental issue of legal rights to gold-bearing land could simply
not be addressed within the private property regime without
incurring enormous ﬁnancial costs. Unless the project could
afford to buy mining licenses, the best it could hope for was to
beg companies for access to workings thought too poor to be
economically viable. This was, to be sure, better than nothing.
But because micro mining had been presented as a potential
full-time occupation, rather than as a supplementary source of
income, the small plots of mining company leavings were sim-
ply not enough to satisfy expectations. In retrospect, the vision
of a professionalized, regulated artisanal mining sector seems
unrealistic without legal rights to substantial deposits, some-
thing made prohibitively expensive by the private property re-
gime for land and beyond the means of development projects
committed to working within it.
Last, we see how divisive the production of new resources can
be, how generative of conﬂict and competition. The company-
led and subsequent people’s gold rush led to countless conﬂicts
of access, a competition that the companies are deﬁnitively
winning. Although development goals include the promotion of
“community” (Asia Foundation 2006:1; SDC 2015:15),23 the
small niche created for legal micro mining has produced new
sites for local competition and conﬂict over resources—the few
allocations of gold-bearing land that the mining companies do
make. The governor of the subdistrict (bag) containing the
Zaamar goldﬁelds complained, for example, that the district
(sum) governor routinely blocked requests for grants from the
subdistrict so that he could award any that were available to his
family and friends (Bayarmaa Altangerel, interview, June
2013).24 Indeed, the project itself represented a resource to be
exploited by formal or informal means. As the viability of22. See Sneath (2003:454) for discussion of other such knowledge
products.
23. See SAM project website: http://www.sam.mn. See also Creed
(2006) on “community.”
24. Bayarmaa Altangerel is a governor of the Khailaast Bag of the
Zaamar Sum. On paper there are 20 registered partnerships in the sub-
district as part of the project. However, in 2013 only two of these were
actually operating, and even thesewere only working intermittently, usually
for only a few days a month. These two partnerships are supposed to work
within the authorized site, in line with the contract established with the
company that owns it. In reality, however, the mining teams constantly
encroached illegally on other unauthorized sites they felt had richer de-
posits. Although these two partnerships work within the same project, they
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began to divert the small amounts of investment funding
available to other projects such as vegetable growing instead of
forming mining partnerships. This is characteristic of the wider
development sector inMongolia, in which results can be created
on paper if not in fact so as to make the most of available op-
portunities. Having “mined out” the SAMproject, keymembers
of the Enkhmönkh are now looking for other development
projects to engage with. And yet the prospect of transforming
opportunistic resource exploitation into sustainable livelihoods
remains as elusive as ever.Comments
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As Polanyi pointed out, “market forces taken to an extreme
would destroy democracy and a functioning economy” (Kuttner
2017). This prophecy can serve as a tracer to follow the trajec-
tory of social development after the state social economy col-
lapsed in Mongolia; it can also serve as a canary in a coal mine
for other postsocialist countries or reforming socialist countries
with “local characteristics” such as China.With the wider trans-
formation of political economy and globally expanding condi-
tions of precarity in mind, G. Munkherdene, a Mongol native
and a former “ninja” miner, and David Sneath, an anthropol-
ogist specializing in Mongolia and Inner Mongolia, have made
an in-depth analysis of the disheartening conditions and the
deplorable dilemma that many Mongolian artisanal miners
found themselves trapped in. Several points raised by the ar-
ticle merit our attention.
First, international agencies such as the Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation (SDC), aiming at properly for-
malizing informal artisanal mining through laws and regula-
tions and promoting local development and rural income en-
hancement, failed to meet the immediate needs of the local
miners, who would rather have the gold-bearing land for ex-
cavation and the equipment required to make the work prac-
ticable than the training and “capacity building” provided by the
agency. The agency failed to contextualize anthropologically the
particularities of local conditions, and they did not take into
account those dimensions that no internal agencies can afford to
ignore: history, culture, and power. Especially in terms of power,
the primary purpose of the government is to legitimize itself and
to mobilize political support rather than to guide action. In thehave a very uneasy relationship and frequently complain about each other
to the project leaders.
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Munkherdene and Sneath Enclosing the Gold-Mining Commons of Mongolia 825same way, the nation-state makes use of UNESCO’s Intangible
Cultural Heritage to solidify its national boundaries and make
them more “tangible” (Herzfeld 2014).
Second, prerevolutionary, state socialist, and neoliberal
Mongolia created different regimes of value for land. Each re-
sultant resourciﬁcation, again, led to changes in human rela-
tionship and the relationship between humans and the land.
The story of “ninja” mining testiﬁes the desperate, seemingly
hopeless, efforts with which those late-development countries
such as Mongolia try to catch up with developed countries in
terms of economy if not completely politics. According to an-
thropological wisdom, the boundaries of culture, history, econ-
omy, and politics usually do not coincide. Any reform including
poverty-alleviation programming has to take into account the
culture and history of targeted regions. The present situation of
Mongolia is a result of processual negotiations that involve a
plethora of human and nonhuman dimensions. Clifford Geertz
(2000) has quite relevantly said that any politics “have to be
targeted, tailored to circumstances, to times, and places, and
personalities.”
Third, the authors captured dynamic, local performative
understanding of nutag, meaning “homeland.” By evoking its
indexical connection to the “home,” what is signiﬁed by the
word can be expanded to include the entire nation in addition to
a locality. Therefore, it helps the locals to claim exclusive rights
over the land according to their in situ deﬁnition of nutag.
Despite the fact that the Mongolian way of life is not necessarily
all based on nomadism, their “nomadic ideology” is not pure
imagination. Owen Lattimore accurately pointed out the divide
between “the right to move” and “the right to camp” when
depicting the confrontational mutuality that existed between
pastoralists and agriculturalists in Inner Asia (Lattimore 1951:
66). Mobile pastoralism, supported by “nomadic ideology,”
“involves the combination of exclusive rights to the use of some
areas of land withmore public access to other seasonal pastures,
regulated by local political authorities.” In both the presocialist
and the state socialist periods, such public access to land, though
not without regulation by local authorities, had been main-
tained. It is interesting to compare the notion of “state” or
“nation” inMongolian and in Chinese.While the Chinese word
guo graphically depicts a population with weaponry standing on
a piece of land, protected on four sides by walls, the Mongolian
equivalents, ulus and oron, mean “people” and “position,” re-
spectively, and do not involve land or walls. In connection to
such conceptualization of and their traditional attitudes to land,
“the default property regime for the gold-bearing areas was a de
facto commons.” However, with an increasing pace of re-
sourciﬁcation, as mentioned in the article, “a de facto public
resource was created . . . only to be progressively privatized and
enclosed by increasingly powerful mining company interests.”
Whereas ninjaminers try to gain access to land use, not its own-
ership, mining companies aim to enclose the land by acquiring
licenses and expel those ninja miners step-by-step. Meanwhile,
among ninja miners themselves, powerful mining teams could
evict less powerful teams when necessary.This content downloaded from 131.11
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aFourth, the authors provided a persuasive critique of the
Lockean notions of property, which claims that “the application
of labor to matter creates natural rights of ownership over it.”
The fact inMongolia is that working on a piece of land does not
lead to recognized rights over it. We are now back to Polanyi,
who said that extreme marketization would destroy democracy
and a functioning economy. He is right.
Fifth, the authors have pinpointed the problem of lacking
legal rights to substantial deposits, which rendered unrealistic
the efforts of professionalizing and regulatingmining sectors. In
relation to this problem, ofﬁcials at higher levels often blocked
requests for grants from the subdistrict so that they “could
award any that were available” to their family and friends. It is a
common problem for postsocialist and reforming socialist
countries: the merger of power with the pecuniary creates
horrible corruption and extreme social and economic discrep-
ancy between the rich and the poor. Between neoliberalism and
state socialism, is there a third way?Gregory Delaplace
LESC, Maison de l’archéologie et de l’ethnologie, 21 allée de
l’université, 92023 Nanterre Cedex, France (g.delaplace@yahoo.fr).
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A traveler stepping into a ger—the Mongolian collapsible felt
tent—can expect to be presented with a series of goods: tea, a
platter of cheese products and fritters, perhaps cigarettes, snuff
tobacco, and possibly alcohol. It is important according to the
hospitality etiquette that all these things should be offered in an
open manner to a guest—the tea and alcohol served, the platter
displayed, the pack of cigarettes gaping, and the snuff bottle’s lid
slightly ajar. By extension, all supplies surrounding the guest that
are “in the open,” “available” (il zadgai), such as books stacked
away between the roof and the roof-poles, newspapers, food, or
else, are generally up for grabs. Conditions apply, of course:
anything that has been put on the household’s altar is off-limits;
more generally, one cannot appropriate all of one thing, but only
a part and indeed a part that does not compromise the whole (a
few cheese crumbs on top of the platter, one cigarette out of the
pack, one sniff of tobacco, or half a page from a book as rolling
paper). On the other hand, the goods in a ger that are hidden or
locked away, even if their location is known to the traveler, are
not for the taking—thus the content of the house’s trunks and
baskets, or of any closed bag for that matter (see Empson
2011:116 et seq.). Therefore, displaying goods is usually a sign
they are potentially exploitable (unless they are for sale, of
course), whereas conversely leaving out in the open stocks that
are not supposed to circulate—like the content of the “fortune-
calling bag” (dallagiin uut), for example—is a sure way to
jeopardize a household’s “fortune” (khishig ; see Chabros 1992).
This fundamental contrast between supplies that are ex-
ploitable and supplies that are not relates to one of the central
questions addressed by G. Munkherdene and D. Sneath in their1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
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the opposition between things hidden and things openly avail-
able seems indeed pivotal. What lies or grows aboveground
tends to be considered free for use and is generally treated as
commons. The conditions mentioned earlier would apply as
well: one is only entitled to a part of any openly available re-
source so long as it does not compromise the whole. Thus, a few
dead branches out of a tree or a few dead trees out of a wood, but
never the last few branches or a single standing tree; the basic
trope of resource exploitation in Mongolia is indeed grazing:
this is what herders let their livestock do before they (ideally)
move to another pasture, but this is also how anyone is basically
expected to act toward available resources.
Therefore, I do not think that, as one often hears, it is for
fear of digging the ground per se that Mongolian people tend
to regard mining as a morally ambiguous activity (digging is
not seen as inherently problematic when growing crops, build-
ing houses, or burying corpses) but rather because of a general
and much deeper unease with the appropriation of things that
are not for the taking. Not to mention the fact that the envi-
ronmental pollution incurred in the process of gold mining
cannot but give the impression of compromising Mongolian
“homeland” (nutag) as a whole—an idea that has been given a
vivid illustration by hip-hop singer Gee in one of his songs
(Minii nutgiig üldee—“Leave Me My Homeland”; see Irvine
2018).
And yet, as Munkherdene and Sneath’s paper shows, every-
body does it. What herder does not go “gold-washing” (alt
ugaakh) at some point during the summer, before or after
having been marmot hunting with his friends and relatives? So,
the question really is: Under what conditions can an unavailable
resource be nonetheless exploited? In the condition it is so
proﬁtable, of course, but not only. The ambiguity inherent to
proﬁt made from mining activities has been well stressed by
Mette High (2017), and indeed, buried treasures are not always
good news in Mongolia. In the course of my own research
(Delaplace 2012), I came across stories of families learning they
were probably sitting on a stock of gold or silk supposedly
buried there by a Chinese merchant before the independence.
Upon discovering this, their ﬁrst move rarely was to grab a
shovel and start digging, like a French family would have, were
they to suspect some “louis d’or” had been hidden somewhere in
their garden. Mongolian families would rather move out,
suspecting the gold would prove deadly if dug out and used.
Paradoxically indeed, treasures in Mongolia are generally to be
found aboveground: they are the infrastructure left behind by
socialist institutions, which can be mined at will by the popu-
lation and sold for parts, or “meteorites” (buumal) found in the
open and charged with an energy available to be harnessed by
whomever knows how (Pedersen 2014).
So again, under what conditions might a hidden treasure
become exploitable in Mongolia? The interesting thing, which
makes this paper all themore valuable, is that there is no deﬁnite
answer yet to this question; it is still a debated one in Mongolia.
Some (mainly activists, often backed by shamans claiming toThis content downloaded from 131.11
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms arepresent the interests of the ancestral homeland) assert that
mining resources should not be exploited under any circum-
stance, whereas others affect not to care, or resort to ritual ﬁxes
to make it acceptable and actually proﬁtable in terms of Mon-
golian concepts of “fortune.” Now G. Munkherdene and David
Sneath’s paper could be seen to point to another way of un-
derstanding Mongolian ambivalent response to these qualms.
They stress that the resource in this case is not so much gold
itself as the “knowledge product” of its localization: geological
surveys would have made gold almost as “openly available” as
any other resource left there by the previous generation for the
next to exploit. Still, not everyone agrees, and the Mongolian
gold rush might well be the “test” (sensu; Boltanski and
Thévenot 2006 [1991]) after which what counts as a treasure—
and as resource, fortune, or moral behavior—will need to shift
and be granted a new consensual qualiﬁcation.Bumochir Dulam
Department of Anthropology, University College London, 14
Taviton Street, London WC1H 0BW, United Kingdom (b.dulam@
ucl.ac.uk), and Department of Anthropology and Archaeology,
National University of Mongolia, University Bldg. No 2, Baga
Toiruu 47, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (bumochird@gmail.com). 21 II 18
G.Munkherdene andDavid Sneath argue that the unauthorized
small-scale mining known as “ninja mining” or “micro mining”
in Mongolia is not simply the result of precarity, poverty, and
underemployment, but a response to the appearance of Mon-
golian natural resources as a new de facto public resource that
was created in the wake of the collapsed state socialist economy.
Most importantly, they argue that at the heart of small-scale
mining are fundamental issues regarding property relations and
access to resources. As the authors accurately point out, con-
testing entitlements to land and access to natural resources
enables artisanal miners access to gold resources. In the fol-
lowing, I will expand Munkherdene and Sneath’s discussion
with three points that may help to clarify why and how the
Mongolian response to these “new de facto” resources took the
shape that it did.
First, in Mongolia mining sites always become a site for
conﬂict (cf. Bebbington 2012:225; Watts 2004:71–72) between
various stakeholders and agencies that claim entitlement. All of
them employ different reasoning to justify their entitlement
to the land and access to resources. For example, the state and
the people (ard tümen) ofMongolia are ofﬁcially declared as the
owners and protectors of the land and natural resources in the
constitution of Mongolia. Mining companies have licenses is-
sued by the government. According to the Minerals Law, local
district governments have the authority to issue permits to
use the land for mining purposes (Ulziibayar and Tsetsenbileg
2010:104). As the authors of this article argue, local people, in
turn, justify their rights using the concept of nutag, which is a
locality and homeland. And “ninja miners” from other parts of1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
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article in the constitution that declares that the natural resources
of Mongolia are subject to the “people’s power” (ard tümnii
medeld). Both shamanism and Buddhism, on the other hand,
hold that human beings are not the masters (ezen) of land and
natural resources, but the truemasters and owners are the spirits
of the locality (High 2017). In Mongolia, all these claims to le-
gitimacy are persuasive, rightful and legitimate in their own
terms, and they can have signiﬁcant power in entitlement con-
ﬂicts. These contesting entitlements are always intertwined and
interpreted differently, which makes the issue of ownership of
land and access to natural resources ambiguous and ﬂuid. Ac-
cording to Rebekah Plueckhahn (forthcoming), the division
between public and private ownership of land in Mongolia is
completely blurred. Ambiguity and blurriness therefore put
public resources, in thewords of the authors of this article, into a
“de facto” or “commons” status.
Second, not only has the appearance of the new de facto
public resource resulted in “ninja” or “micro”mining. In fact, all
of these resources were always available for Mongolians. Local
people used to know which places held what kinds of mineral
resources (Murray 2003:118), but extracting mineral resources
was taboo (High 2017). Historical documentation—about “gold
patrols” (altny haruul), established from the mid-eighteenth
century (Banzragch 2004; Nasanbaljir 1964; Tuya and Battomor
2012) to ﬁght against Russian and Chinese illegal gold miners,
and local resistance movements against foreign gold-mining
companies andQing policies, to promotemining inMongolia in
the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century—dem-
onstrates that most of the local aristocratic lords and their
subjects seriously considered exploitation of mineral natural
resources as something incompatible (harshtai) with the pas-
toral way of life and beliefs of Mongolians (Sodbaatar 2013:31–
33, 48, 53, 54, 55). For this reason, althoughmining was present,
it was alien to many Mongolians (cf. Murray 2003:115). Here,
we can see a strong contrast between the attitudes of Mongo-
lians over 100 years ago and contemporary Mongolians who
work as “ninja” or “micro” miners. People’s beliefs and per-
ceptions regarding the land and natural resources radically
changed over the past 100 years, starting when the theocratic
government of Bogd Khan decided to seriously commodify
natural resources to fund the emerging nation-state (Batsaikhan
2009:72; Bonilla 2016; Sodbaatar 2013:92; Tuya and Battomor
2012:75–78); continuing with the development of the mining
sector in Soviet socialist times; and ﬁnally culminating in the
latest expansion of the mining sector in the market era. Al-
though many Mongolians still consider mining to be inappro-
priate (Murray 2003; High 2017), these changes have made it
acceptable for manyMongolians to work in mining. Even some
contemporary shamans I interviewed justiﬁed local people’s
engagement in small-scale gold mining by saying, for example,
that if local people do not exploit the gold then nonlocal
Mongolians or foreigners will take it anyway: a radical trans-
formation of perspective. In other words, the discussion about
small-scale mining is not only a matter of the de facto publicThis content downloaded from 131.11
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aresources but also about changes in the beliefs and perceptions
of individual agents in terms of the moral possibilities of par-
ticipating in mining in the ﬁrst place.
Third, the collapse of state socialism and the neoliberal turn
issued in an era understood in Mongolia to be one in which
anyone is free to engage in any form of moneymaking (chölööt
ediin zasag). The overarching legacy of this tendency has fueled
all sorts of economic practices, including what the authors de-
scribe as the “scavenger economy.” In otherwords, the regime of
the liberal economy created the freedom and liberty for people
to engage ﬂexibly in different proﬁt-making practices. The leg-
acy of the regime of economy has inspired people to try different
businesses, including those that can be harmful to the envi-
ronment or that contradict traditional cultural knowledge and
teachings.Lars Højer
Center for Comparative Culture Studies, Department of Cross-
Cultural and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen, Karen
Blixens Plads 8, bygning 10, 2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark
(lhoejer@hum.ku.dk). 20 II 18
In this important contribution to the burgeoning anthropo-
logical literature on mining in Mongolia and property relations
and resource extraction more generally, Munkherdene and
Sneath explore the transformations that have taken place in the
Mongolian political economy over the past decades through a
study of informal small-scale mining. They show how a de facto
public resource, emerging in the wake of the collapse of the
socialist state in the 1990s, ﬁrst gave rise to so-called ninja
mining but was then increasingly appropriated by powerful
mining companies to the detriment of small-scaleminers. Apart
from concentrating on the ramiﬁcations and implications of this
process of privatization andmonopolization, they also attend to
the role played by development projects in theMongolian age of
the market. I will address each of these contributions in turn.
At the most general level, the article sketches the transfor-
mation of property regimes, moving from prerevolutionary
and socialist Mongolia to ninja mining and the new neoliberal
order in which private property is increasingly “enclosed” and
guarded (see also Højer and Pedersen, forthcoming). Ninja
mining, the prime concern of the article, appeared in the in-
terstice between socialism and the private property regime of the
market, when mineral survey materials from the State Geofund
were made public and gave miners access to a de facto public
resource, gold deposits, that was “relatively free for the taking.”
The authors observe that this ninja mining was mainly about
extracting gold and moving on. Much in line with mobile
pastoralism, they argue, it was as such more concerned with
getting access to the use of land than with gaining actual own-
ership. Although this comparison is appealing and thought-
provoking, it also gives rise to some questions on my part. To
begin with, it would be useful to know how far Munkherdene1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
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ample, relate this process ofmovement (extraction and “moving
on”) to the stability of “higher authorities,” political entitlements
to use resources, and the lasting attachment to a homeland,
features that they also associate with mobile pastoralism? The
ninja economy appears to be based on emerging groups and
physical force rather than on established authorities, stable
entitlements, and “homelands” only. Could one not also—or
rather—see the workings of ninja mining less as a continuation
of Mongolian traditions of mobile pastoralism and more as a
small-scale illustration of the workings of multinational ex-
tractive industries that also aim to “extract and move on”?
Would the notion of a “de facto commons” not risk hiding a
reality of a not-so-de facto commons where strong ninja mining
teams monopolized (privatized?) land much in the same way as
mining companies would do nowadays by using guards and so
forth? In other words, although I believe that the authors offer a
sound description of this process, their ethnography may
prompt further reﬂection on their conclusion regarding a pro-
gressive privatization of the Mongolian economy in the post-
socialist period. Is the dichotomy between commons and pri-
vatization really an adequate one for capturing the speciﬁcities
of these property regimes? Or should we rather see the process
as the progression of more stable and large-scale capital-driven
“enclosures” and less as the invention of enclosure/private
property as such? So, are we simply witnessing an increasing
“privatization,” or could we discern different kinds of enclo-
sures? Munkherdene and Sneath’s ﬁne, accurate, and revealing
description of processes that have taken place in postsocialist
Mongolia may thus prompt further reﬂection on the vocabulary
used for describing processes of “enclosure” and, in the end, it
may also lead us to challenge more explicitly baseline assump-
tions about “commons,” “privatization,” “market,” and “neo-
liberal regimes.”
A second contribution concerns the role played by develop-
ment projects in relation to ninja mining and the new property
relations. Munkherdene and Sneath show how a development
project was concerned less with orienting practice than with
legitimizing itself by creating “an appealing goal, well able to
mobilize the necessary political support.” This goal was to for-
malize informal mining through recognition, training, and ca-
pacity building. As such, the project never managed to attend to
the key problem for ninja miners. This problem was access to
resources in the form of gold deposits and not formalization as
such. Providing access to resources, however, was beyond the
project’s ﬁnancial means, and one may well argue that the
project simply did its best with the ﬁnancial means available.
The authors’main critiques of the development project, then, is
not that it did not try to achieve its goals but that the project, on
the one hand, worked within a vision that was unrealistic, be-
cause the project could not afford “legal rights to substantial
deposits,” and, on the other, that it mainly worked with goals
that could legitimize the project itself to maintain political, in-
stitutional, and economic support. Yet, they also hint at a more
substantial critique when writing that development projects areThis content downloaded from 131.11
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms a“committed to working within” a private property regime. This
raises a more fundamental (and, in critiques of development,
classical) question about the implicit ideological work carried
out by development projects. The project worked to help, ed-
ucate, and gain ofﬁcial recognition of ninja miners, yet did so
by accepting the assumptions inherent in the new (private)
property regime that also served to undermine the ninja econ-
omy in the ﬁrst place. Working within a discourse of “help” and
“recognition,” the project thus not only failed to address the
fundamental power structures that initially gave rise to the
problem but—maybe as an unintentional side effect (cf. Fergu-
son 1990)—also served to reproduce such property relations in
the disguise of “doing good.” This critique, I believe, could have
been made slightly more explicit, as it may also have alluded to
larger questions concerning (side) effects of development proj-
ects and the relation between “the formal” and “the informal” as
a distinction with strong political implications that may sustain
already established property regimes. In this way, the article does
not only open new discussions of resource extraction in relation
to emerging property regimes in Mongolia, it also contains po-
tentials for critically exploring wider processes, also beyond the
Mongolian context.Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo
Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, National University
of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar 14200, Mongolia (bimbamn@gmail.com).
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“Enclosing the Gold-Mining Commons” examines the interre-
lationship of property regime change and mining in contem-
porary Mongolia and provides detailed analysis of how devel-
opment organizations justify their intervention. This article also
contributes new insights about explaining the root cause of
conﬂicts over “natural” resources between mining companies
and local people, including those artisanal or micro miners. The
authors argued that the new private property regime in Mon-
golia made mining companies seek to enclose the “de facto
commons” through obtaining licenses, whereas local micro
miners still prefer to share de facto commons only with the
people who belong to the same locality using the concept of
nutag (homeland) and “expanding their social networks to have
access to resources” (Ichinkhorloo 2017a:64). Artisanal and
small-scale mining (ASM) was translated as bichil uurkhai
(micro mining) by Mongolian government and development
organizations. This term, “microminer,” is widely used for those
formalized “ninja” miners in Sustainable Artisanal Mining
Project (SAM project) target sites since 2010. Most ofﬁcial
people avoid using the term “ninja,” which carries many neg-
ative connotations such as selﬁsh, poor, lawless, greedy, and
criminal. But micro miners call other nonorganized micro
miners XAMO (khamo) or ninja miners. My comments focus
on three issues: (1) clariﬁcation of de facto commons in mining
sites in Mongolia and how these commons persist through cor-1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
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icy shifts, and (3) types of ninja mining and property relation-
ships.
My ﬁrst comment concerns the authors’ argument about
enclosing de facto commons. I am curious to know if these
enclosed resources are still deﬁned as de facto commons or
private property. If so, for whom? Whose perspective is legiti-
mate in deﬁning the resources as common or private property?
Is it state or company or local people or ninjaminers or public or
others? In other words, are ninja miners “commoning the en-
closed resources” again (Gibson-Graham, Cameron, and Healy,
2016:196)? It is not secret that many ninja miners now practice
micro mining in places like mining licensed areas or strictly
protected areas. For example, many micro miners work in
Centerra Gold company’s mining licensed area near Noyon
Uul, archaeological sites of ancient Hunnu Empire (ﬁrst century
BCE to third century CE), and Khövsgöl Lake National Con-
servation Park or Great Gobi Strictly Protected Area behind the
Altai mountain range. Many micro miners gained skills to
prospect new gold sites, and the companies are now usingmicro
miners as their scouts or pathmakers while shifting the blame
for mining environmental damages onto “ninja”mining (Ichin-
khorloo 2017b:73).
Second, the authors have also discussed how development
organizations intervened in micro mining in Mongolia and
what they delivered to micro miners and the mismatch of
miners’ expectation and reality. Given what I found in my
earlier research and interviews with “ninja” miners while I was
working with SAM project people and Osaka University’s
GLOCOL researchers in 2011–2014, I would like to suggest an
idea that the development organizations constantly change their
policies to adjust to new situations. Therefore, they become
unable to deliver outcomes planned earlier. For instance, apart
fromcreating a decentworkplace through formalization of ninja
mining, the SAM project had the ambitious goal to transform
ninja miners into entrepreneurs such as small-scale license
holding companies or cooperatives like the ones in Colombia
and Peru. Until 2012, the SAM project refused to work in
Uyanga and Zaamar Sums to avoid project “failure,” because
these sums were hot spots for illegal activities, disorder, and
conﬂicts between mining companies and ninja miners through-
out the 2000s (High 2008). However, the project new man-
agement and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
in Mongolia changed its policy from a formalization approach
to a human rights–based approach to an alternative livelihoods
approach in 2005–2018. Within this policy change, the Na-
tional Human Rights Commission of Mongolia and SAM proj-
ect conducted human rights assessment in ninja mining areas
and documented severe human rights abuses such as killing,
sexual assault, detention, beating, and illegal conﬁscation of
ninja miners’ properties by company securities and ignored by
authorities in Zaamar and Uyanga Sums (Odgerel et al. 2012).
This urgent issue demanded rapid policy shift toward conﬂict
resolution through initiating a trilateral agreement that bound
mining companies to voluntarily allocate small plots of land toThis content downloaded from 131.11
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms a“ninja” miners. This way, the project shifts from one policy to
another.
My third comment concerns the authors’ claim that “[the
ninja miners] have no interest in retaining property relations to
land after working it out.” It is true that ninja miners do not
come back to the land after its resources are exhausted. But
depending on the type of mining and size of mineral deposits,
micro miners continue to work in one place for up to 20 years
and form a special relationship with gold-bearing sites. For
example, hard rock micro miners of Bayankhongor aimag have
mined Tsagaan tsakhir gold deposits over 20 years, Bornuur
micro miners kept working on Sujigt mountain gold deposits in
Selenge aimag from 1996 to 2011, and other hard rockminers in
Tunkhel village, Selenge aimag have been exploiting a Bor tolgoi
gold deposit over 7 years after verbal agreement with Centerra
Gold company. Generally, most micro miners are temporary
and seasonal, and they do not rely much on gold mining for
their livelihoods. However, a few places like hard rock mining
sites became permanent, and new relationships are forming
around hard rockmining sites. For example, Tsagaan tsakhir lo-
cal micro miners together organize the local “Ovoonii naadam”
celebration and sponsor local government’s celebrations and
sport events. Most hard rock micro miners work in separate
groups called “brigades” (for projects, they are called “partner-
ships”). Every brigade is sponsored and led by a wealthy and
powerful person. Inmost cases, these local powerful andwealthy
people form their own brigades employing people from various
places, mainly from local places or nutag. They also possess their
own mineshafts and lock them up when they are away. These
relationships, looking more entrepreneurial as the SAM project
encouragedprivatepropertyrelations, aredifferent fromtheones
that temporary alluvial micro miners have.Lhamsuren Munkh-Erdene
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Advokatenweg 36,
06114, Halle (Saale), Germany (lkhamsuren@eth.mpg.de). 12 II 18
Different Shades of Neoliberalism
One fascinates with the stubborn unwillingness and the com-
plete lack of any long-term interest and commitment on the side
of those whowere engaged in “ninjamining” to “ the sustainable
artisanal mining,” “the occupation,” and “the ownership on
mining plot.” Hence one doubts if their attitude and behavior
can, indeed, be said to have “resembled” that of Mongolian
mobile pastoralists to their land. Given the lack of commitment,
one also wonders if it was really the inability of the development
project “to address the fundamental issues of property relations
and access to resources” that led to the “enclosing of the gold-
mining commons” or “de facto public resource” that these
“ninjaminers” are said to have created. The absence of any long-
term commitment including that of ownership seems to have
been rooted in the stealthiness of the practice in Mongolia’s1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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As the authors outline, land and natural resources, though
regulated, had, and to some extent still have, been the commons
for centuries in Mongolia. The principle is still enshrined in
Mongolia’s constitution.25 In this moral and legal property re-
gime, the “ninjas”were defectors. Theywere taking advantage of
the commons, and they were keenly aware of this; thus, their
activities were ninja-like, that is, stealthy, devious, illicit, and
opportunistic. Hence the unwillingness and lack of any long-
term commitment. Thus, it is questionable if one can assert what
the ninjas did as a creation of “public resource.”
The authors seem to claim that land inMongolia “‘belonged’ to
the emperor” or “higher authorities.” Yet, as recent scholarship
demonstrated, land always belonged to ulus or the community,
and only the members of the given community had access to it,
and the political authorities regulated the access (Atwood 2012).
Resourciﬁcation seems to be another term for commodiﬁcation
of the commons; however, the larger question involved here is
the establishment of the private property regime and the sub-
sequent enclosing of the commons or the public property by
private interests. The esteemed name of the procedure is pri-
vatization, and its darker side is dispossession, poverty, and
polarization. As privatization enclosed the commons, the com-
moners or community members, or the public, had been dis-
possessed of their commons. The present property regime on
mining was installed inMongolia with the help of international
developmentagencies as apart of the shock therapy in1997with
the adoption of the minerals law that allowed private interests
to own mineral deposits. By 2010 nearly 17% of the country’s
territory was licensed for mineral exploration and exploitation,
displacing thousands of herders from their pastures. Today,
Mongolia’s annual household income per capita is US$1,466,
and one-third of the population lives below the poverty line.
The ofﬁcial unemployment rate is about 12%. According to the
UNDP’s 2015 report, “Richest 20% ofMongolia consumes 40%
of the total national consumption and the poorest 20% ofMon-
golia consumes about 7%.”26 A massive dispossession entailed
correspondingdisentitlement,displacement, andpoverty. It also
generated a massive income disparity and social polarization,
perhaps inevitable casualties of the neoliberal regime.Wedonot
know if divide and rule was ever a sought end of the neoliberal
policy. Moreover, there is some darker dimension to it too.
As the primary target of privatization was the commons or
“the public property” (ulsyn ömch), branded now with an alien-
ating novel phrase “the state property” (töriin ömch), for in-
stance, Ulaanbaatar’s public space became one of the most
sought-after targets. Every inch of Ulaanbaatar’s public space,
from public toilets to playgrounds to schoolyards, had already
been privatized. M. Enkhbold, the present speaker of the par-25. The Constitution of Mongolia, Article 6 (Mongol ulsyn ündsen
khuul,’ Zurgadugaar züil ).
26. United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2017–2021,
Mongolia, 2017, p. 19.
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public space. His declared net worth totals 3 billion tugrik (US
$1.5 million) whereas his public remuneration averaged about
US$500 per month over the years.27 While running for the
Mongolian presidency in 2017, M. Enkhbold publicly declared
that he had never engaged in any business activities in his life-
time.28 ErdenetMining Corporation (EMC) isMongolia’s largest
“state-owned” enterprise, generating nearly 15% of the nation’s
GDP. And, it is the greatest industrial complex that this nation
has ever built, and it used to be aMongolian-Soviet/Russian joint
venture. However, in 2016, an unknown Mongolian private
entity bought its 49% from Russia. While the Mongolian presi-
dent, Ts. Elbegdorj, is credited for facilitating the deal with V.
Putin in Tashkent during ameeting of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, theMongolian government voluntarily renounced
its prerogative in favor of the buyer without the knowledge of the
parliament.29 The newly elected parliament found the deal illegal
and nationalized the 49%. Both the president and the ousted
prime minister, Ch. Saikhanbileg, vehemently defended the deal
in front of the parliament and the public.30 In particular, the
president denounced the parliament for “robbing a private
property” and claimed that “all the international economic and
ﬁnancial institutions will halt their activities in Mongolia from
the moment of the decision, and immediate international eco-
nomic and ﬁnancial sanctions will be imposed on Mongolia.”31
Meantime, EMC’s 51% was on trial at the High Court in
London because EMC guaranteed and indemniﬁed Just Group
LLC, aMongolian private company, in 2009 for its obligations to
South Africa-based Standard Bank. The owner of the Just Group
readily confessed that he had forged the guarantee. Questioned
about EMC’s guarantee on a televised interview, S. Bayar, who
was the prime minister when Just borrowed the money from
Standard, not only indicated that he has close ties with the owner
of the JustGroup but also expressed his deep gratitude to him; yet
he ﬂatly denied any knowledge of the guarantee.32 Bayar’s ap-
pointee, Ch. Ganzorig, the director of EMC, claimed that he did
not issue the guarantee. However, recently the High Court found
that EMC indeed guaranteed and indemniﬁed the obligations
and ruled EMC to pay more than US$100 million to Standard
Bank. According to Bayar’s own admission, his daughters and
ﬁrst ex-wifeandwife, togetherwithhisclose friends,ownandrun
real estate business worth millions of US dollars in the United
States. The PanamaPapers disclosed that two of his daughters as-erdenet-mine/.
30. Ch. Saikhanbileg’s testimony: https://www.youtube.com/watch?vpG
6Sx4uDRyuU.
31. Ts. Elbegdorj’s speech: https://www.youtube.com/watch?vpdauwa
WA0zEo.
32. S. Bayar’s interview: https://www.youtube.com/watch?vptevEB4vx
FmE.
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accounts.33 The Panama Papers also revealed that Bayar’s suc-
cessor as primeminister, S. Batbold, andhis brotherhad offshore
entities and accounts too.34 Meantime, Mongolia won’t receive
any dividend from its Oyu Tolgoi mine, a deal that Mongolia
signed with Rio Tinto during Bayar’s premiership, at least until
2032; instead Mongolia owes Rio Tinto US$1 billion. S. Ba-
yartsogt, Bayar’s ﬁnanceminister whowas one of the signatories
of Oyu Tolgoi deal, was also exposed by Offshore Leaks as hav-
inganoffshoreaccount inCreditSuissewithadepositamounting
to at least 8.2 million euros.35 Yet in 2015 the Mongolian parlia-
ment legalized all the hiddenwealth, including that of politicians
and government ofﬁcials. The law not only pardoned those who
disclosed their hiddenwealth of all the criminal charges (or legal
liabilities) but also forgave their tax debt.36 “Ninja mining”was a
practice of this sort, essentially, an opportunistic looting or pil-
laging of the commons, clearly, out of desperation and whatnot.
Yet, the “ninjaminers” and thedevelopmentprojectdidnot have
the power to legalize the illicit practice of “ninja mining” into
sustainable artisanal mining. Whereas “ninja miners” were just
an aggregate of law-breaking commoners, the development proj-
ect, obviously, lacked the leverage that the International Mon-
etary Fund, the Word Bank, or the Asian Development Bank
had enjoyed. Moreover, though there might have been some
sympathy, the public generally disapproved of their actions. In
addition, their actions, as the authors show, were conﬂicting
with organized, powerful private corporate interests. As for the
Mongolian authorities, legalizing of their activities was to be-
come a precedent of condoning looting publicly. Oligarchy and
kleptocracy were never a stated aim of any neoliberal policy.
In fact, we do not know if its designers foresaw oligarchy and
kleptocracy as its inevitable ills, and if they did condone it to jus-
tify their higher, noble ends. We also do not know if they ever
foresaw the possibility that the oligarchy and kleptocracy could
capture the state, and through it make otherwise “looting of the
public” legal andnormal.Oligarchic andkleptocratic regimes that
we ﬁnd in many of the postcommunist countries are essentially
products of the neoliberal shock therapy. Neoliberal privatization
created an environment where communist nomenklatura not33. Offshore accounts and entities of the daughters of S. Bayar: https://
offshoreleaks.icij.org/search?utf8p%E2%9C%93&qpBayar&ep&commit
pSearch.
34. S. Batbold and his brother’s offshore entity and account: https://
offshoreleaks.icij.org/stories/sukhbaataryn-batbold; https://offshoreleaks.icij
.org/nodes/12182099.
35. S. Bayartsogt’s offshore account: https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes
/178152. See also a Reuters report on the transfer of 8.2 million euros to
S. Bayartsogt’s account (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-rio-tinto
-plc-mongolia/swiss-seize-bank-accounts-amid-probe-linked-to-rio-tinto
-mongolia-mine-idUSKBN1GV1AG) and Swiss Court ruling on March 2,
2018 (https://www.bger.ch/ext/eurospider/live/de/php/aza/http/index.php
?highlight_docidpaza%3A%2F%2Faza%3A%2F%2F02-03-2018-1B_258
-2017&langpde&zoomp&typepshow_document).
36. Ediin zasgiin il tod baidlyg demjikh tukhai: http://www.legalinfo
.mn/law/details/11269.
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an oligarchy, but also turned the communist regimes into klep-
tocratic regimes.
Moreover, evidence shows that while international develop-
ment agencies were helping Mongolia to establish a free market
economy, behind the curtain powerful international corporate
mining interests were lobbying “Canada, the U.S., British, Jap-
anese, Australian and German efforts to encourage (cajole, ha-
rangue, etc.) the Government of Mongolia into staying out of
the mining business.”37 Private ownership of land and natural
resources had been not normal in Mongolia for its entire exis-
tence, and the government always regulated access to the
commons. Defections from the commons by commoners were
and are, perhaps, always present; as such, it can be accepted as
normality, albeit inconvenient. However, what is not normal is
that the institution of which the primary raison d’être is to
curtail defections serves for defections of thosewho captured the
state. As Ulaanbaatar’s space, or EMC, or the legalizing of the
hidden wealth of the kleptocracy illustrate, Mongolia’s “political
and business elite” use Mongolian government as a tool for take-
over of the commons and the public property. Neoliberalism
not only normalized private ownership in Mongolia but also
reduced Mongolian government to a tool to protect and ad-
vance private corporate interests at the expense of the public.
Either its ills or the shortcomings of the designers, the neo-
liberal policy not only allowed the nomenklatura to loot the
country’s commons and the public property but also helped to
create a kleptocratic regime. We do not know how sustainable
this new normality can be. Ironically, when Yu. Tsedenbal, who
presided overMongolia for 4 decades, retired in 1984, he owned
no apartment and had only 6,000 tugrik (US$1,635 by ofﬁcial
ﬁxed rate, or US$300 by “black market” rate) in his savings
account.38 And that was perfectly normal back then.Natalia Ryzhova
Economic Research Institute, Far Eastern Branch of Russian Acad-
emy of Science, 153 Tikhookeanskaya Street, Khabarovsk 680042,
Russia (ryzhova@ecrin.ru). 25 II 18
Each time I read papers on the survival of “ordinary people”
from the Russian, Mongolian, or Kyrgyz remote areas, of those
who were born in the world of socialism and had to adapt to the
world of capitalism, I askmyself the same questions. If there was
an opportunity for the residents of small towns and villages to
have conditions for smoother, painless transition and for sus-
tainable livelihoods, what resources, rules, or relations could
guarantee their worthy adaptation to the new reality? Each time37. “Visiting Canadian trade minister advises against state ownership of
natural resources,” US Embassy cable, January 11, 2008. https://wikileaks
.org/plusd/cables/08ULAANBAATAR15_a.html.
38. Speech delivered by J. Munkhbat, chief cabinet secretary, on Yu.
Tsedenbal’s hundredth anniversary: http://www.ugluu.mn/225228.html.
1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
832 Current Anthropology Volume 59, Number 6, December 2018the answer is hopelessly negative: no opportunities, rules, re-
sources, or relations could save those people whomake upmost
of the population of Russia or Mongolia from the crisis, and
from what Munkherdene and Sneath called a “scavenger econ-
omy.”
The article “Enclosing the Gold-Mining Commons of Mon-
golia” not only demonstrates how the transition to the market
made people turn to informal gold mining but also explores the
reasons for the desperate attempts to solve the problem of the
poor through the usual, “prescribed” neoliberal developmental
reasoning. In the article, the Sustainable Artisanal Mining
Project (SAM project) acts as another hopeless attempt to break
poverty bonds. The SAM project identiﬁes the ninja “problem”
in terms of a lack of formalization, dearth of jobs, and insufﬁ-
cient training of locals engaged in informal activities. The
problem of poverty in the SAM project, like in many other
similar ones explored by anthropologists, has been narrowed to
the technical issue of training the poor, providing them with
legal papers, methods of self-organization, and other simple
solutions. The despair of the situation is that the SAM project
did not raise, did not solve, and largely could not address the
issue of property relations and access to resources that lies be-
hind the ninja “problem.” The reason why the SAM project
failed and, moreover, why it had to fail, is that it was designed to
enforce new property regimes that were supposed to exclude or
at least signiﬁcantly limit informal gold miners from access to
resources.
The article by Munkherdene and Sneath does not raise the
question of successfulness of market reforms in Mongolia or
other countries. Nevertheless, the authors infer that not only
that “transforming opportunistic resource exploitation into
sustainable livelihoods remains as elusive as ever,” but also
that the overall success of reforms remains an illusion—at least
if one focuses on the success of the reform for the “ordinary
people.” This illusion is obvious for the millions of poor people
living not only in Mongolia, but also in Russia or the Ukrainian
outback, who informally mine gold or coal, ﬁsh, or gather wild
plants. This illusion is obvious if one is aware that before the
transition those people worked for collective farms, factories, or
plants, and, therefore, had a regular income. Largely it does not
matter for them whether those factories and farms had been
effective or not. More important is that they had been paid a
monthly salary and had a living standard similar to a resident of
“a big city.” This illusion is obvious when one realizes the daily
deadly risk of mercury poisoning in artisanal gold mining, the
collapse of a self-made coal mine, or the clutches of a hungry
bear. This illusion is obviouswhen one realizes that people living
even in small towns, and especially in villages, had had access to
medical care. Nowadays they need to go several hundred kilo-
meters off-road to get to the hospital, but before—and people
remember it well—the road had been of better quality and there
used to be regular buses. This illusion is obvious if one keeps in
mind that, before the transition, compulsory education had
been accessible for children of those people. Nowadays they
have to get to school by the same broken road. And hardly did
they agree that the “old” education did not suppose the devel-This content downloaded from 131.11
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aopment of critical thinking, but, on the contrary, it made them
believe in “our better tomorrow.”
In other words, if one uses Ferguson’s thought and considers
the transition to the market as a big developmental project, then
one should admit that this project deﬁnitely failed to help poor
people. Even more, the market transition caused many “ordi-
nary people” to become the real poor, those whose living
standards are visibly different from the living standards of the
rich owning resources. Why did it happen? Without raising the
question of why the market reforms failed to help many “or-
dinary people,” the article by Munkherdene and Sneath never-
theless offers an analytical tool for answering the question. They
do so by studying the process of “resourciﬁcation” (term im-
plemented by High [2010]), or the transformation of items into
resources, into “sources of potential wealth.”Munkherdene and
Sneath explore resourciﬁcation of the land containing gold and
of geological funds. They showed, for example, that although
geologists and former mine workers had knowledge of how to
transform geological funds into “sources of potential wealth,”
this activity was shortly identiﬁed as illegal. Thus, an exclusion
of them from the access to resources was only a matter of time.
All market reforms, in a sense, are a redeﬁnition, the tran-
sition of non-resources into resources. Transition required not
only legal privatization, but also awareness and public accep-
tance of resourciﬁcation. Some resources were rather ready for
such a transition (e.g., apartments or factories), and some were
rather not, such as land or public education. Accordingly, re-
invention of the poor in postsocialist countries was a process of
preventing “ordinary people” from becoming resourceful,
complemented by the process of discursively identifying any
attempts to participate in resourciﬁcation in terms of illegality.
On the contrary, “Communist nomenklatura successfully re-
invented themselves as an oligarchic plutocracy” precisely
through guaranteed participation in both resourciﬁcation and
discursive deﬁnition of this process in legal terms.
Following the research logic of Ferguson (1994), the ques-
tion “Why did it happen?” can be replaced with the questions
“What has been achieved? What was the result of the neolib-
eral reforms in the postsocialist countries?” The answer is, as I
see it and as the article byMunkherdene and Sneath suggests to
us: reforms and privatization made usual while unjust state of
affairs to happen. There are poor and rich, and the rising gap
between them is attributed to the access to resources. However,
unlike Ferguson’s outcomes, well known to every student of
the anthropology of development, the net effect of the market-
reform project was not the depoliticization of the issue of
resource allocation. On the contrary, the distribution of re-
sources in postsocialist countries underwent thorough politi-
cization (such issues as freedom, democracy, property rights,
etc.). But this politicization—not the same politicization as
Ferguson asked for—led to the same end. The poor have to
survive because they do not have access to resources.
Next year, Germany will be celebrating the thirtieth anni-
versary of the Berlin Wall collapse. In 2018, 27 years have
passed since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceased to
exist, and 26 years have passed since the adoption of the new1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
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property privatization there. More than a quarter of a century
is sufﬁcient enough to draw conclusions, albeit intermediate,
to reﬂect on the results and make assumptions about the
further development of the countries of the so-called former
socialist camp. Reﬂecting on the results of 25 years of reforms
is not sufﬁcient to evaluate the socioeconomic consequences of
the reforms for ordinary people. After all, not only the econ-
omy caused socioeconomic transformations both in Mongolia
and in other socialist countries. Preventing the “Cold War”
and reducing the unnecessary costs associated with it, refusal
of political repressions, and recognition of the rights and
freedoms of citizens were among those digniﬁed causes that
made sense of the reforms and encouraged ordinary people to
actively support the market transition. However, now many of
them feel cheated. Moreover, here and there we see a rollback
to previous models, ideas, and ideals. It is enough to open up
any media resources to doubt that the world has overcome the
problem of the Cold War.Eric Thrift
Department of Anthropology, University of Winnipeg,
515 Portage Avenue, Winnipeg MB R3B 2E9, Canada
(e.thrift@uwinnipeg.ca). 25 II 18
In their ethnographic critique of the SAM project, Munk-
herdene and Sneath evoke a number of recognizable themes
from the anthropology of development: mismatches between
project beneﬁciaries’ expectations and what the development
project is able to provide, conﬂicts arising from the project’s
misreading of “community” solidarities, and an overall elision of
politics. The “need for formalization” at the core of this project is
a clear example of what Li (2007, 2011) calls “rendering tech-
nical”—establishing a circumscribed, legible group of stake-
holders (micro miners) whose needs can be mapped to an
expert-driven technical intervention (SAM). Within this famil-
iar critical terrain, the authors usefully draw attention to prop-
erty relations as a focus of analysis, evoking areas for greater
theorization on how alternative “property regimes” may be
discursively generated or undermined by international projects
and their participants.
I suspect we all might agree that SDC has brought about
tangible gains for some resource users. As noted in this article,
members of formalized micro mining partnerships established
under the SAM project beneﬁt from new political representa-
tion, legal recognition of their right to access mineral resources,
improved workplace safety, and access to health and social se-
curity beneﬁts (SDC 2012a, 2016). This project has additionally
contributed to shifting public and policy-maker opinion
somewhat in favor of small-scale miners. At the end of their
article, however, Munkherdene and Sneath suggest that things
have begun to unravel: as the SAM project winds down, the
micro miners shift their attention to other activities—and to-
ward other development projects to “mine.”What went wrong?This content downloaded from 131.11
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aOn one level we might simply infer an excessively zealous
commitment by project staff to maintaining positive spin,
leading to absurdly counterfactual narratives such as the one
celebrating the “success” of the dissolved Enkhmönkh NGO.
Looking more deeply, however, we detect important gaps be-
tween the project’s representations and the realities lived by
project participants. For small-scale miners, is gold or the SAM
project the more valued resource? Do the miners join part-
nerships to secure tenure of common-property resources, or
do they simply use formalized property rights as a mechanism
for protecting an open-access regime? Most importantly, do
they even aspire to view themselves as miners in occupational
terms?
This last question seems to reach at the core of the issue,
because the professionalized “artisanal and small-scaleminer” is
a role performedwithin the context of the project, rather than an
identity that precedes the SDC intervention. The formalization
logic is predicated on an assumption that informal mining,
driven by poverty shocks or by opportunism, is a temporary
arrangement with the potential to give rise to “communities”
who engage in permanent or seasonal “community mining”
(SDC 2012a: 13). For this to occur, miners must develop oc-
cupational solidarity—that is, they must identify as miners,
rather than as people who seasonally or occasionally “go to the
goldﬁelds” (altand yavakh) as part of a diversiﬁed livelihood
strategy. Project literature thus meticulously describes small-
scale mining as a distinct occupational sector, encompassing
“20% of the rural workforce” and constituting the “highest
employer in the mining sector” (Singo 2012:5). Miners are
portrayed as both entrepreneurial and community oriented, as
demonstrated by the “success story” of their investment in a
mercury-free processing plant at Bornuur (Singo 2012). These
representations contradict the reality of goldminers as a diverse
range of actors who, in many cases, cannot beneﬁt from for-
malization: students trying to earn their tuition during the
summer holiday, small-scale herders or underpaid civil servants
looking for supplementary cash income, and so on.
Munkherdene and Sneath thus invite us to think about the
“differences between the development project representation of
ninja mining and the understandings of those actually engaged
in the practice.” This brings to mind the question Robert
Chambers (1997) put to development professionals, “Whose
reality counts?” reﬂecting his contention that development
professionals and the poor live in different realities—the one
grounded in standardization and measurability, the other in
local experience, diversity, holism, and complexity. I think it
may bemost helpful to think about these realities less in terms of
ontological difference, however, than in terms of situated ways
of “doing,” in the performative sense. For project participants,
being an entrepreneurial “small-scale or artisanal miner” is a
matter of performing a role, partly as a means of accessing
project resources. It is within this context that we observe the
translation of local needs—often material—into forms that are
“legitimate” in the language of the project (Mosse 2001).
The “rendering technical” of the development project can
also be viewed as a performative exercise, to the extent that the1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
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action of being discussed. Appel (2017) has described such
performative discourse, productive of “national economies”
and similar imaginaries, as occupying an “as-if ” space between
the world and its representations. In the case that Munk-
herdene and Sneath describe, both “property” and “resources”
might be seen as inhabiting this same space.We see that claims
to various rights over resources such as land and gold have
been asserted on the basis of customary use, place-based com-
munity (“nutagism”), the labor of extraction, or a priori pos-
session by the state of alienable property rights. These claims are
facilitated by what the authors call a neoliberal “private property
regime,”whichwemight take as establishing the groundwork for
the “as-if ” of property as something that can naturally be owned.
This space of contingent and contested resource access is divi-
sive, as Munkherdene and Sneath assert in their conclusion, but
it is also a productive one, in which results created “on paper”
ﬁnd tangible—if sometimes unexpected—purpose in the real
world.Sören Urbansky
German Historical Institute, 1607 New Hampshire Avenue North-
west, Washington, DC 20009, USA (urbansky@ghi-dc.org). 13 II 18
This paper, focusing on “ninja gold mining” in postsocialist
Mongolia, provides an instructive picture of the wider trans-
formation of political economy in this landlocked state sand-
wiched between China and Russia.What struckmemost while
reading this insightful and brilliantly written article by
G. Munkherdene and David Sneath are the historical parallels
with unauthorized small-scale gold mining in other parts of
Inner Asia. Responding to this fascinating piece of research, I
will focus on historical connections to an earlier “gold rush”
during the late nineteenth century that seem to remain some-
what underdeveloped.
About a century before Soviet and Mongolian geologists
found signiﬁcant alluvial gold deposits in Mongolia in the
1970s and 1980s, the discovery of gold had triggered a rush in
the still rather porous the Sino-Russian borderlands, in par-
ticular to Eastern Transbaikalia and the Amur Basin. In those
years thousands of fortune seekers, peasants, and drifters who
went to try their luck came from neighboring regions and
other areas of Russia and China, and some even from abroad.
Most famously perhaps was the “Zheltuga Republic” in the
northernmost part of Manchuria in the 1880s (Gamsa 2003;
Zatsepine 2017:62–67).
Gold mining became a signiﬁcant economic sector in both
the Chinese and the Russian borderlands. By the turn of the
century, dozens of mines operated in northern Heilongjiang
Province in the vicinity of Heihe and in northern Hulun-
bei’er, owned mainly by Chinese, Russian, British, and Amer-
ican entrepreneurs. Mining of this precious metal loomed even
more important on the Russian side. In Transbaikalia aloneThis content downloaded from 131.11
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms athere were about 150 private and ofﬁcial gold mines, almost
half of them near the lower and middle reaches of the Argun
(Kommisiia 1901:140–148; Kormazov 1927; Torgashev 1927).
Although the exploitation of gold in Transbaikalia had already
peaked in 1901, the number of gold diggers increased over the
following years. The majority of the 17,210 workers who would
be employed in the goldﬁelds of Transbaikalia in 1909 came
from China (Obzor 1911). A signiﬁcant amount of the gold was
trafﬁcked from Russia to China—inverting the ﬂow of other
contraband. This remained unchanged until the consolidation
of Soviet rule, when the share of Chinese subjects in the Soviet
goldﬁelds began to fall and then declined considerably with the
deportation of Chinese subjects from the USSR during the mid-
1930s (Larin 2009:119–140).
A comparison of the prerevolutionary Sino-Russian with the
postsocialist Mongolian “gold rush” reveals a striking degree of
convergence: the nature of private gold mining in these rural
and remote regions was highly ﬂuid in both cases. The number
of those attracted by the precious metal was signiﬁcant, yet it
varied from season to season and is impossible to quantify. The
bulk of people engaged in digging stemmed from rather poorer
population strata and were neither full-time miners nor pro-
fessionals. Thework in the goldﬁelds was primarily seasonal due
to the harsh climate and other activities miners were involved
in such as herding, farming, petty trading, and so forth. These
highly volatile qualities are reﬂected in the nature of the dwell-
ings around themines. Building structure was temporary. Hous-
ing, shops, and taverns were densely populated during the
summer months and nearly abandoned during the winters.
In both cases, albeit for different reasons, a lowmoral authority
of the state and its inability to enforce laws facilitated the
unsanctioned mining activities. Whereas at the turn of the
twentieth century, state bureaucracy of Russian and Chinese
empires at their shared periphery was still frail with weak
allegiances of the people, the collapse of state socialism had
undermined the authority and executing powers in 1990s Mon-
golia. Themost important common feature however is, perhaps,
a similar notion of land ownership in which the private own-
ership of land in the current commercial sense does not exist
and the landscape is seen as public in some sense.
Obviously, differences between the prerevolutionary and
postsocialist settings exist. While in turn-of-the-twenty-ﬁrst-
century Mongolia micro mining appears to be a national phe-
nomenon with Mongols from surrounding areas involved, the
late nineteenth-century communities of gold miners in the
Russo-Chinese borderland were far traveled and of various
ethnic and national backgrounds. This contrast can be ex-
plained by the formation and maturation of the nation-state.
Both the often-secret Sino-Russian mines on the Amur and
its tributaries as well as the “ninja mines” in central Mongolia
were short-lived. They disappeared when vertical power was
(re)established and state monopoly or, in the Mongol case,
global mining companies entered the market. Increasingly, le-
gitimate owners enforced their exclusive legal rights, and exec-
utive organs supported their claims by being assertive in
punishments of illicit gold-mining operations.1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
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We are very grateful to all the contributors for the range and
depth of reﬂection that they have added to our work. We
cannot address all the many perceptive points that they raise
here, but we would like to offer some comment on three
broad themes.
First, there is the question of the how the story of “ninja”
mining informs our understanding of Mongolia’s wider capi-
talist political economy, and the results of neoliberal reform. As
Naran Bilik notes, in Polanyian terms the scavenger economy
appears to be a symptom of a society placed at the mercy of
market forces. But it is also clearly an outcome of the particular
policies of the Mongolian state, which Lhamsuren Munkh-
Erdene describes as the targeting of public property—including
every inch of public space in Ulaanbaatar—so that the business
elite could convert it into private wealth. This reminds us of
Harvey’s (2005:160) point, that what Marx termed “primitive
accumulation” is not a completed historical phase of capitalism
but an ongoing process that busily searches out new assets for
privatization. But this could also be seen as a form of scavenging,
albeit on a grand scale, the seizing of whatever resources appear
as available. At a time when the nascent super-rich were busy
mining private wealth from the assets that the state did control,
tens of thousands of ordinary people set about mining wealth
from assets that the state could not fully secure.
The overall results of market reforms in Mongolia were not,
as Natalia Ryzhova remarks, the main focus of our paper. But as
several discussants suggest, successive postsocialist govern-
ments failed to seriously reduce mass poverty. About a third of
the population were living below the poverty line in the late
1990s and, although the rate has ﬂuctuated year on year, roughly
the same proportion have been stuck there ever since. Poverty
reached an estimated 39% in 2009–2010 (Gan-Ochir and
Ariun-Erdene 2017:17), for example, and although this ﬁgure
fell to 22% in 2014, the 2016 estimate placed almost 30% of the
population below the poverty line—living onUS$60 amonth or
less.39 The volatility of the poverty rate tells its own story, in-
dicating the large number of people living precariously close to
the poverty line and liable to drop below it when the economy
slows. This brings us to Lars Højer’s point regarding the implicit
ideological work carried out by development projects thatmight
be said, following Ferguson (1990), to help reproduce existing
property relations. The inability of the SAM project to achieve
its ambitious goals was, no doubt, partly the result of the sort of
policy inconsistency that Byambabaatar Ichinkhorloo describes.
In part it also reﬂected the sort of logics implicit in the notions of
“community development” that Eric Thrift points to, in which
potentially solidary occupational groups are misleadingly pic-
tured as a natural feature of the economy, ready to beneﬁt from39. World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017
/10/17/2016-poverty-rate-in-mongolia-estimated-at-296-percent.
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project felt bound to work within the existing property regime,
the “new normality,” as LhamsurenMunkh-Erdene puts it, that
entailed the exclusive private ownership of almost all major
sources of wealth in the country. It seems to us that this placed
themost severe limits upon the extent towhich the project could
deliver well-paid and stable employment for micro miners.
Second, we turn to the question raised by Gregory Dela-
place—what counts as a resource inMongolia? The answers, we
feel, are likely to be historically determined, a result of changing
regimes of property and value. As Ryzhova points out, the
market reforms were themselves a process of redeﬁnition, both
in legal terms and in public perception, which identiﬁed new
sources of potential wealth. We appreciate Delaplace’s distinc-
tion between the hidden and the open, and the notion that
“making visible” is central to the processes of recognition and
resourciﬁcation. Here the historical perspectives that Bumochir
Dulam and Sören Urbansky introduce are particularly reveal-
ing. As Bumochir shows, some sorts of mineral resources were
recognized (as potential sources of wealth for outsiders) in Qing
times, because “gold patrols” were instituted to guard against
foreign gold miners, and the Bogd Khan administration also
tried to raise funds by recognizing minerals as natural resources
and commodifying them. Interestingly, Sodbaatar’s (2013)
study of the historical materials on illegal gold mining and
precious stone collection show that it was not only foreigners
who might be culprits, but local herders and even lamas.
Itmay be, then, that ofﬁcial normativity regardingwhat counts
as a resource, and who is entitled to it, is never uniform and total,
and that any property regime is likely to have what Lhamsuren
Munkh-Erdene called “defectors”—those who take the “things
that are not for the taking” as Delaplace puts it. The scale and
character of this defection seems bound to reﬂect the historical
particularities of the age, the levels of want, and the intensity and
extent of dominant normativity. In this respect the parallels be-
tween the late nineteenth-century gold rush in the Sino-Soviet
borderlands described by Urbansky and contemporary Mongo-
lian micro mining are intriguing. Not only are the shifting popu-
lations and seasonal patterns of informal work strikingly compa-
rable, but the historical demise of the gold rush is revealing. The
defectors from the old czarist property regime for land were
eventuallyovertakenbytheBolshevikstate;wealthwasreturnedto
the hands of the powerful, albeit Soviet rather than corporate.
Lastly, there is the question of how to characterize the utili-
zation of land in themicro-mining gold rush, and to what extent
this has anything to do with the longue durée of Mongolian
history. We might doubt, as Lhamsuren Munkh-Erdene does,
whether “ninja” attitudes to landwere really informed bymobile
pastoralism, particularly in light of the way in which the con-
temporary practices resemble those found in the nineteenth-
century gold rush described by Urbansky, which involved Rus-
sians and Chinese miners, rather thanMongols. In both epochs,
it seems, and independent of any particular mobile or sedentary
lifestyle, very similar patterns emerged. And as Højer percep-
tively points out, we could as well draw parallels between the
micro miners and multinational companies, because they also1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
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certainly agree that there is no need to assume some sort of dis-
tinctive cultural logic at work, based on nomadism, shamanism,
Buddhism, or any of the other standard terms of debate. But
when it comes to the presence of various norms, values, and
notions in public culture, it seems to us that we are bound to
look to history and historical processes, some of them long term,
to account for them. So contemporary Mongolian attitudes to
land reﬂect the particularities of a path-dependent history that
includes the installation and superimposition of various nor-
mative schemas, including religious and secular cosmologies,
aesthetic sensibilities, land-use practices, and property regimes.
The emphasis placed upon Mongolia’s distinctive history and
“nomadic civilization” (nüüdliin irgenshil) in twentieth-century
public culture (see Tsetsentsolmon 2014) meant that, as Naran
Bilik notes, an examination of the inﬂuence of the concept of
nomadism is not an act of pure imagination. Rather, it involves
an excavation of the history of ideas and their practical ex-
pression (if any).
Instead of regarding culture as some sort of integrated system,
which produces characteristic behavior as a result of its own
internal logics and character, we can treat it as a repertoire of
common meanings, representations, and practices—including
“situated ways of doing” in Thrift’s neat phrase. This provides
actors with the cultural resources to navigate their social worlds
and to make various claims upon them. In this respect we found
Bumochir’s historically informed perspective particularly helpful
because he describes attitudes to land in terms of contestation, so
that amultiplicity of claimsmay bemade on the basis of different
normative frameworks, be they the authority of local govern-
ment, the constitutional codes of the nation-state, or the spiritual
and religious frames termed shamanic or Buddhist. Of course,
claims that it is (or is not) permissible to take mineral resources
may not be recognized by the state or other citizens. On this
point Lhamsuren Munkh-Erdene argues that the gold rush en-
tailed “taking advantage” of the commons and did not lead to the
creation of a recognized public resource as such. We would not
disagree, and used the term “de facto public resource” to distin-
guish it from a de jure or normative form of public property. Our
point was that in practical terms members of the public could
gain access to the goldﬁelds, and a large number of them did so.
This brings us to Højer’s point that an analysis in terms of
“privatization,” “enclosure,” “commons,” and so on invites fur-
ther reﬂection as to the underlying assumptions that these
concepts bring with them. We agree, because although these
encompassing terms can serve heuristically to stimulate com-
parison and the recognition of resemblance, they might also be
candidates for inclusion in Appel’s (2017) category of “as-if ”
performative discourse described by Thrift, along with “prop-
erty” and “resources.”Of course semantic exploration of all these
terms is beyond the scope of any given paper, but we can cer-
tainly try to examine the extent to which the actual practices of
micro miners resemble the analytical concepts. Here, Byam-
babaatar’s observations are particularly revealing. The hard rock
micro miners he describes in Bayankhongor and Selenge haveThis content downloaded from 131.11
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms atried to establish longer-term exclusive use-rights, organized by
local wealthy and powerful persons into production “brigades”
(a term reminiscent of the old collectives and state enterprises);
they lock up their mineshafts to keep others out. This clearly
reﬂects the nature of the hard rock deposits in question, which
take longer to mine out. But it also demonstrates a more general
point—within the wider commons category, the actual use of
resources is bound to be exclusive to some degree. In the pastoral
commons (and this is not to imply cultural connection), winter
pastures are generally kept for exclusive use, and even in entirely
open-access rangeland any given blade of grass could be said to
be “monopolized” by the ﬁrst animal that eats it, not shared out
between those theoretically eligible.
Many common-pool resources put people in potentially ri-
valrous positions, be they car parking places or pavement space
for begging, because the resource units they provide cannot be
used by all the would-be appropriators at the same time (Ostrom
1990:31). This is a well-recognized feature of common resource
systems. As we described, most micro-mining teams were
strongly concerned with gaining and keeping access to gold-
bearing land. Placed outside the legal structure of the state,
those engaged in the actual extraction of wealth seek to turn
their particular small patch into, in Højer’s wry phrase, the
“not-so-de-facto commons.” So, like the big mining teams who
evict weaker rival groups by force, the hard rock miners who
lock up their shafts try to create something like exclusive pri-
vate rights over the resources in question, at least for as long as
it is useful to them. These are aims and goals—understandable
enough since the normalization of private ownership in Mon-
golia noted by LhamsurenMunkh-Erdene. But until and unless
the users gain legal ownership and public recognition, their
exclusive use will remain insecure and liable to future challenge.
Disputes of this type are found in the region of Khövsgöl men-
tioned by Byambabaatar, where the Centerra Gold company
has expanded its land claims to encompass areas where “ninjas”
had been working. Centerra’s claims to exclusive use of the land
were challenged on the grounds that, under the amended Law
on Minerals, the local government had granted legitimate ac-
cess tomicro-mining partnershipsmade up of district residents,
many of them within the partnership structure created by the
SAM project. And of course, where companies were unable to
enforceexclusiverights to land(“enclosure”), somemicrominers
dared to work it for themselves, thus “commoning the enclosed
resources again,” as Byambabaatar put it. Other exclusionary
rights, such as those imposed by the state in conservation areas,
may also be ignored by the bold. It isworthnoting, however, that
the micro mining in the Khövsgöl Lake National Conservation
Park andGreatGobi Strictly ProtectedArea thatwas reported in
the past has, to our knowledge, all but disappeared. In general it
seemsthatstatepower,whichcanserveasavehicle forprivateand
corporate interests, is catching up with the micro-mining
commoners, just as the Soviet variety did in the Sino-Russian
goldﬁelds about a century ago.
—G. Munkherdene and David Sneath1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Munkherdene and Sneath Enclosing the Gold-Mining Commons of Mongolia 837References Cited
Appel, Hannah. 2017. Toward an ethnography of the national economy.
Cultural Anthropology 32(2):294–322. [ET]
Appel, Peter W. Uitterdijk. 2005. Small-scale mining in Mongolia—a survey
carried out in 2004. Danmarks og Grønlands Geologiske Undersøgelse Rap-
port 2005/4. https://unites.uqam.ca/gmf/globalmercuryforum/pages/members
/europe/Denmark/ﬁles_peter_appel/2005-4%20PA%20%20Small%20scale
%20mining.pdf.
Asia Foundation. 2006. Communities partner to protect environment and
livelihoods. Mongolian Highlight. https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs
/MGmining.pdf.
Atwood, Christopher. 2012. Banner, otog, thousand: appanage communities
as the basic unit of traditional Mongolian society. Mongolian Studies 34:1–
76. [LM-E]
Banzragch, C. 2004. Altain haruulyn tuhaid [About the patrols of the Altai].
In Manjiin erhsheeliin üyiin Mongol [Mongolia in the times of the Qing
occupation]. J. Boldbaatar, ed. Pp. 86–92. Ulaanbaatar: Orbis. [BD]
Batsaikhan, O. 2009. Bogdo Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, the last king of Mongolia:
Mongolia’s national revolution of 1911. Ulaanbaatar: Admon. [BD]
Bebbington, Anthony. 2012. Conclusions. In Social conﬂict, economic devel-
opment and the extractive industry: evidence from South America. Anthony
Bebbington, ed. Pp. 216–228. London: Routledge. [BD]
Boltanski, Luc, and Laurent Thévenot. 2006 (1991). On justiﬁcation: econo-
mies of worth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [GD]
Bonilla, Lauren. 2016. Extractive infrastructures: social, environmental, and in-
stitutional change in resource-rich Mongolia. PhD dissertation, Clark Uni-
versity, Worcester, MA. [BD]
Brook, Pete. 2015. Inside the dangerous world of amateur “ninja” gold miners.
Wired, January 29. http://www.wired.com/2015/01/alvaro-laiz-ninjas-gold-rush
-in-mongolia/.
Bruun, Ole, and Ole Odgaard. 1996. A society and economy in transition. In
Mongolia in transition: new patterns, new challenges. O. Bruun and O.
Odgaard, eds. Pp. 23–41. Richmond: Curzon.
Byambabaatar, I. 2016. Mongolia’s diverse economy: survival assemblages in
Mongolia’s capitalist advancement. Paper presented at the Mongolian-Made
Capitalism conference, National University of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar, No-
vember 16.
Chabros, Krystyna. 1992. Beckoning fortune: a study of the Mongolian Dalalga
ritual. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. [GD]
Chambers, Robert. 1997. Whose reality counts? putting the ﬁrst last. London:
Intermediate Technology. [ET]
Creed, Gerald. 2006. Reconsidering community. In The seductions of com-
munity: emancipations, oppressions, quandaries. G. Creed, ed. Pp. 3–22. Ox-
ford: Currey.
Davis, Mike. 2004. Planet of slums: urban involution and the informal pro-
letariat. New Left Review 26:5–34.
Delaplace, Gregory. 2012. Neighbours and their ruins: remembering foreign
presences in Mongolia. In Frontier encounters: knowledge and practice at
the Russian, Chinese, and Mongolian border. F. Billé, G. Delaplace, and C.
Humphrey, eds. Pp. 211–233. Cambridge: Open Book. [GD]
Descola, Philippe, and Gísli Pálsson. 1996. Nature and society: introduction.
In Nature and society, anthropological perspectives. P. Descola and G.
Pálsson, eds. Pp. 1–21. London: Routledge.
Empson, Rebecca. 2011. Harnessing fortune: personhood, memory and place in
Mongolia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [GD]
Escobar, Arturo. 1994. Encountering development: the making and unmaking
of the third world. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
———. 2006. Difference and conﬂict in the struggle over natural resources: a
political ecology framework. Development 49(3):6–13.
Ferguson, J. 1990. The anti-politics machine: “development,” depoliticization,
and bureaucratic power in Lesotho. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press. [LH]
———. 1994. Anti-politics machine: “development” and bureaucratic power in
Lesotho. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gamsa, Mark. 2003. California on the Amur, or the “Zheltuga Republic” in Man-
churia (1883–86). Slavonic and East European Review 81(2):236–266. [SU]
Gan-Ochir, D., and B. Ariun-Erdene. 2017. Implications of economic growth,
poverty and inequality in Mongolia over the period of 2008–2012. North-
east Asian Economic Review 5(2):15–29.
Geertz, Clifford. 2000. Available light: anthropological reﬂections on philo-
sophical topics. Kindle edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[NB]This content downloaded from 131.11
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aGibson-Graham, J. K., J. Cameron, and S. Healy. 2016. Commoning as a
postcapitalist politics. In Releasing the commons: rethinking the futures of the
commons. A. Amin and P. Howell, eds. Pp. 192–212. London: Routledge. [BI]
Goldman, Marshall. 2003. The piratization of Russia: Russian reform goes
awry. London: Routledge.
Grayson, R., W. Murray, U. Tuul, T. Delgertsoo, and B. Tumenbayar. 2003.
Ninja gold miners of Mongolia: assistance to policy formation for the in-
formal gold mining sub-sector in Mongolia. Ulaanbaatar: Mongolian Busi-
ness Development Agency, Canada Fund Mongolia.
Grayson, Robin. 2007. Anatomy of the people’s gold rush in modern Mongolia.
World Placer Journal 7:1–66.
Grifﬁn, K. 1995. Economic strategy during the transition. In Poverty and the
transition to a market economy in Mongolia. K. Grifﬁn, ed. Pp. 1–26. New
York: St Martin’s.
Harvey, David. 2005. A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Herzfeld, Michael. 2014. Intangible delicacies: production and embarrassment
in international settings. Ethnologies 36(1):47–61. [NB]
Hetherington, Kregg. 2009. Privatizing the private in rural Paraguay: precarious
lots and the materiality of rights. American Ethnologist 36(2):224–241.
High, Holly. 2010. Laos: crisis and resource contestation. Southeast Asian
Affairs 2010:153–161.
High, Mette M. 2008. Dangerous fortunes: an anthropological study of the
Mongolian informal gold mining economy. PhD dissertation, University of
Cambridge.
———. 2013. Cosmologies of freedom and Buddhist self-transformation in
the Mongolian gold rush. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute
19(4):753–770.
———. 2016. A question of ethics: the creative orthodoxy of Buddhist monks
in the Mongolian gold rush. Ethnos 3(1):80–99.
———. 2017. Fear and fortune: spirit worlds and emerging economies in the
Mongolian gold rush. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Højer, Lars, and Morten Axel Pedersen. Forthcoming. Urban hunters: dealing
and dreaming in times of transition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
[LH]
Humphrey, Caroline. 2010. Foreword. In Mette High: Ayultai khishig: Mon-
goliin alban bus altnii uurkhain ediin zasag dakhi khorongo ba etsegchlel
[Dangerous fortunes: wealth and patriarchy in the Mongolian informal gold
mining economy]. Bumochir Dulam, ed. Ulaanbaatar: Admon.
Ichinkhorloo, B. 2017a. Environment as commodity and shield: reshaping
herders’ collective identity in Mongolia. In Pastoralist livelihoods in Asian
drylands: environment, governance and risk. A. Ahearn, T. Sternberg, and
A. Hahn, eds. Pp. 41–70. Winwick: White Horse. [BI]
———. 2017b. Khugjil ood khutluulj bui bidnii zam: Uul uurkhai baigal orchin
[Road paved for development: mining and environment in Mongolia]. In
Zam: Mongoliin tald zurah zam [Road: the future painted on Mongolian
steppe]. Cetsenkhuu and Byambakhorol, eds. Pp. 52–82. Ulaanbaatar:
Soyombo. [BI]
Irvine, Richard. 2018. Seeing environmental violence in deep time: perspectives
from contemporary Mongolian literature and music. Environmental Hu-
manities 10(1):257–272. [GD]
Karpoff, Boris S., andWilliam E. Roscoe. 2005. Report on Placer gold properties
in the Tuul Valley, Zaamar Goldﬁeld, Mongolia. Ulaanbaatar: Khan Resource.
Knight, Sam. 2007.Ninjaminers carve out a newnation.TimesOnline, July 21. http://
ﬁnd.galegroup.com/ttda/infomark.do?&sourcepgale&prodIdpTTDA&user
GroupNamepcambuni&tabIDpT003&docPageparticle&searchTypepBasic
SearchForm&docIdpIF503591150&typepmultipage&contentSetpLTO
&versionp1.0.
Kommisiia (Kommisiia dlia sobraniia i razrabotki svedenii o sibirskoi zoloto-
promyshlennosti i dlia sostavleniia programmy izsledovaniia zolotonosnykh
raionov), ed. 1901. Perechen’ zolotopromyshlennykh raionov Sibiri i opisanie
priiskovykh dorog. St. Petersburg: Tipograﬁia L. Smol’ianinova. [SU]
Kormazov, V. A. 1927. “Zolotopromyshlennost” v Kheiluntszianskoi prov-
intsii. Vestnik Man’chzhurii 3:41–46. [SU]
Kuttner, Robert. 2017. The man from Red Vienna (Karl Polanyi: A Life on the
Left by Gareth Dale, Columbia University Press). New York Review of Books,
December 21. https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/12/21/karl-polanyi
-man-from-red-vienna/. [NB]
Laiz, Alvaro, and David Rengel. 2014. The ninja miners of Mongolia: a look at
the harsh life of the “ninja” miners of Mongolia. Diplomat, April 21. http://
thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-ninja-miners-of-mongolia/.
Larin, Aleksandr. 2009. Kitaiskie migranty v Rossii: Istoriia i sovremennost.
Moscow: Vostochnaia kniga. [SU]1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
838 Current Anthropology Volume 59, Number 6, December 2018Lattimore, Owen. 1934. The Mongols of Manchuria. New York: Day.
———. 1951. Inner Asian frontiers of China. Irvington-on-Hudson, NY:
Capitol; New York: American Geographical Society. [NB]
Li, Tania M. 2007. The will to improve: governmentality, development and the
practice of politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. [ET]
———. 2011. Rendering society technical: government through community
and the ethnographic turn at the World Bank in Indonesia. In Adventures
in Aidland: the anthropology of professionals in international development.
David Mosse, ed. Pp. 57–80. Oxford: Berghahn. [ET]
Locke, John. 2007 (1689). Two treatises of government. Minneapolis: Filiquarian.
Martinez Alier, Joan. 2002. The environmentalism of the poor. London: Elgar.
Millar, Kathleen. 2014. The precarious present: wageless labor and disrupted
life in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Cultural Anthropology 29(1):32–53.
Mongolian Statistical Ofﬁce. 2012. Bichil uurkhai erkhlegchdiin sudalgaanii
negdsen tailan. [Research report of small-scale miners]. Ulaanbaatar: Mon-
golian Statistical Ofﬁce.
Mosse, David. 2001. “People’s knowledge,” participation and patronage: op-
erations and representations in rural development. In Participation—the new
tyranny? Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari, eds. Pp. 16–35. London: Zed. [ET]
———. 2005. Cultivating development: an ethnography of aid policy and
practice. London: Pluto.
Munkherdene, G. 2011. Burzaij baina uu? ninja nar, tednii zokhion baiguulalt
khiigeed ami zuulga [Are you getting loaded? ninjas, their organization and
livelihood]. Ulaanbaatar: Meeting Point.
Munkh-Erdene, Lhamsuren. 2011. Mongolia’s post-socialist transition: a great
neoliberal transformation. In Mongolians after socialism: politics, economy,
religion. B. Knauft and R. Taupier, eds. Pp. 61–66. Ulaanbaatar: Admon.
Murray,William. 2003. Informal goldmining and national development: the case
of Mongolia. International Development Planning Review 25(2):111–128. [BD]
Murray, William, and Robin Grayson. 2003. Overview of artisanal mining ac-
tivity in Mongolia. Washington, DC: World Bank, IFC Mining Department.
Nasanbaljir, J. 1964. Ar mongoloos manj chin ulsad zalguulj baisan alba 1691–
1911 [Tributes of Mongolia to the Manchu Qing 1691–1911]. Ulaanbaatar:
Ulsyn hevleliin gazar. [BD]
National Statistical Ofﬁce of Mongolia. 1999. Mongol Ulsyn Statistikiin
Emkhetgel 1998 [Mongolian statistical yearbook 1998]. Ulaanbaatar: Na-
tional Statistical Ofﬁce of Mongolia.
Navch, T., T. Bolormaa, B. Enkhtsetseg, D. Khurelmaa, and B. Munkhjargal.
2006. Informal gold mining in Mongolia: a baseline survey report covering
Bornuur and Zaamar Sums, Tuv Aimag. Bangkok: International Labor Of-
ﬁce. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-asia/-ro-bangkok/documents
/publication/wcms_bk_pb_123_en.pdf.
Nolan, Peter. 1995. China’s rise, Russia’s fall: politics, economics and planning
in the transition from Stalinism. London: Macmillan.
Obzor Zabaikal’skoi oblasti za 1910 god [Survey/overview of the Trans-Baikal
region in 1910]. Chita, 1911. [SU]
Ochirbat, P. 1996. Tengeriin tsag [The heavenly hour]. Ulaanbaatar: Nomin
Impex.
Odgerel, T., A. Enkhtur, G. Agar-Erdene, and T. Enkhtsetseg. 2012.Mongol dakhi
bichil uurkhai ba hunii erkh 2012 [Artisanal mining and human rights in
Mongolia 2012]. Ulaanbaatar: National Human Rights Commission of Mon-
golia. http://mn-nhrc.org/index.php?newsidp5288. [BI]
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for
collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pedersen, Morten A. 2014. Islands of nature. Insular objects and frozen spirits
in northern Mongolia. In Anthropology and nature. K. Hastrup, ed. Pp. 96–
107. New York: Routledge. [GD]
Plueckhahn, Rebekah. Forthcoming. Shaping urban futures in Ulaanbaatar.
London: UCL. [BD]
Rossabi, Morris. 2005. Modern Mongolia: from khans to commissars to
capitalists. Berkeley: University of California Press.
SDC (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation). 2012a. SDC experi-
ences with formalization and responsible environmental practices in arti-
sanal and small-scale gold mining in Latin America and Asia (Mongolia).
Bern: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. [ET]
———. 2012b. Sustainable artisanal mining project. Ulaanbaatar: Swiss
Agency for Development and Cooperation.This content downloaded from 131.11
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms a———. 2015. Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation in Mongolia
annual report 2014. Ulaanbaatar: Gamma Photo Agency.
———. 2016. Professionalising artisanal mining in Mongolia: a sustainable
artisanal mining project success story. Bern: Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation. http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/April%202016/Mongolia
,%20Professionalizing%20Artisanal%20Mining.pdf.
Shimamura, Ippei. 2014. Ancestral spirits love mining sites: shamanic activities
around a copper-gold mining site in Mongolia. Inner Asia 16(2):393–408.
Siegel, Shefa, and Marcello M. Veiga. 2010. The myth of alternative livelihoods:
artisanal mining, gold and poverty. International Journal of Environment and
Pollution 41:3–4.
Singo, Pascale. 2012. Mongolia case study: analysis of formalization approaches
in the artisanal and small-scale gold mining sector based on experiences in
Ecuador, Mongolia, Peru, Tanzania and Uganda. Nairobi: United Nations
Environment Program. [ET]
Singo, Patience. n.d. Supporting artisanal miners in Mongolia: SDC’s experiences
and lessons learnt. Swiss Cooperation Ofﬁce Mongolia. https://slideplayer.com
/slide/10098346/.
Sneath, David. 2003. Land use, the environment and development in post-
socialist Mongolia. Oxford Development Studies 31(4):441–459.
———. 2004. Proprietary regimes and sociotechnical systems: rights over
land in Mongolia’s “age of the market.” In Property in question: value
transformation in the global economy. K. Verdery and C. Humphrey, eds.
Pp. 161–182. Oxford: Berg.
———. 2010. Political mobilization and the construction of collective identity in
Mongolia. Central Asia Survey 29(3):251–267.
———. 2014. Nationalising civilisational resources: sacred mountains and
cosmopolitical ritual in Mongolia. Asian Ethnicity 15(4):458–472.
Sodbaatar, Y. 2013. Mongolyn Uul Uurkhain Tüüh [The history of mining in
Mongolia]. Ulaanbaatar: Mönhiin Üseg. [BD]
Statistical Ofﬁce of Mongolia. 1993. Mongolyn Ediin Zasag, Niigem 1992
[Mongolian economy and society in 1992]. Ulaanbaatar: J. L. D. Gurval.
Thomas, Constance, and K. Ganbaatar. 2006. Informal gold mining: foreword. In
Informal gold mining in Mongolia: a baseline survey report covering Bornuur
and Zaamar Soums, Tuv Aimag. T. Navch, T. Bolormaa, B. Enkhtsetseg, D.
Khurelmaa, and B. Munkhjargal, eds. Bangkok: International Labor Ofﬁce.
Torgashev, B. P. 1927. Zoloto v Man’chzhurii. Vestnik Man’chzhurii 8:47–52.
[SU]
Tsetsentsolmon, B. 2014. The “gong beat” against the “uncultured”: contested
notions of culture and civilization inMongolia.Asian Ethnicity 15(4):422–438.
Tsing, Anna. 2015. Salvage accumulation, or the structural effects of cap-
italist generativity. Cultural Anthropology, March 30. https://culanth.org
/ﬁeldsights/656-salvage-accumulation-or-the-structural-effects-of-capitalist
-generativity.
Tuya, S., and B. Battomor. 2012.Uul uurhaimongol orond [Mining inMongolia].
Ulaanbaatar: Jikom. [BD]
Ulziibayar, B., and B. Tsetsenbileg. 2010. Minerals laws of Mongolia (1910–
2010). Ulaanbaatar: MBS Law Firm. [BD]
UNEP (United Nations Environment Program). 2012. Analysis of formalization
approaches in the artisanal and small-scale gold mining sector based on expe-
riences in Ecuador, Mongolia, Peru, Tanzania and Uganda: Mongolia case
study. https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/11630/Case_Studies
_Mongolia_June_2012.pdf?amp%3BisAllowedp&sequencep1.
United Nations Systems in Mongolia. 1999. Annual report 1998. http://www
.un-mongolia.mn/publications/anrep98.pdf.
Verdery, Katherine. 2003. The vanishing hectare: property and value in
postsocialist Transylvania. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Watts, Michael. 2004. Resource curse? governmentality, oil and power in the
Niger Delta, Nigeria. Geopolitics 9(1):50–80. [BD]
World Bank. 1994. Mongolia: country economic memorandum: priorities in
macroeconomic management. Report 13612-MOG. Washington, DC: World
Bank, Country Operations Division, China and Mongolia Department, Asia
and Paciﬁc Regional Ofﬁce.
———. 2006. Mongolia: a review of environmental and social impacts in the
mining sector. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Zatsepine, Victor. 2017. Beyond the Amur: frontier encounters between China
and Russia, 1850–1930. Vancouver: UBC Press. [SU]1.184.102 on July 31, 2019 03:02:11 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
